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This research examines the risk to schoolchildren posed by hostile intruders and the 
implementation of a national school security standard designed to mitigate this 
vulnerability and evaluates the utility of innovative perimeter security strategies modeled 
to reduce risk while preserving the requisite academic environment. 
This project originated after the mass murder of 20 defenseless first-graders and 
six heroic faculty members at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, 
Connecticut.  A methodological analysis of existing school security policy was utilized to 
define the problem, to evaluate the variance between school communities, and to 
construct plausible alternative strategies. This project sought to enhance the 
understanding of risk management, offer strategic insight to decision makers and key 
stakeholders, and provide meaningful options for future school security planners. 
The literature on this subject demonstrates that traditional school security 
guidance is provided to local school districts by an array of federal agencies. It is 
primarily focused on incidents of peer hostility and gang violence, and there has been 
marginal attention given to an attack perpetrated by an adult intruder that is unaffiliated 
with the targeted school.  
This type of violence is infrequent, but the extreme consequences evoke emotions 
similar to terrorist attacks in creating public fear, often leading to rash and reactive 
decisions. Many parents trust leaders in the academic community to care for their 
children and provide them a safe and secure environment. This expectation of protection 
has become a significant responsibility for school officials, and the establishment of a 
national school security standard, complete with guidelines and oversight, would help 
ease this burden and change the present school security narrative. 
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The existing security practices in many of our nation’s schools are not designed to defend 
against the threat posed by an armed intruder.  Schools are attractive and vulnerable 
targets primarily because they are powerful social symbols and typically lack operative 
levels of security. Fortunately, school shootings are rare occurrences, but the 
sensationalized narratives that follow create significant fear in both parents and students. 
This apprehension leads to disruptive discourse and policy initiatives that often create 
inequality and partiality.  
Focusing on the threat from a hostile intruder, a methodological analysis of school 
security policy was applied.  This research project defined the dilemmas associated with 
the status quo, examined inconsistencies in existing doctrine, and proffered alternative 
strategies designed to improve security arrangements. The project also endeavored to 
improve the understanding of the associated risk, increase the awareness of decision 
makers and key stakeholders, and provide meaningful options for future school security 
planners. 
The results of the research revealed a collective threat acknowledgment at all 
levels of government. School security practices have been in existence for more than 50 
years, and today most schools have written emergency operation plans designed to help 
protect students and faculty members. Additionally, the federal government has 
designated schools as national critical infrastructure sites due to the correlation between 
national security and education. The research confirmed that this recognition of 
vulnerability has not led to an appreciable level of security and current school security 
procedures are ineffective against hostile intruders unaffiliated with the schools they 
attack. These mass murderers, or “pseudocommandos,” meticulously plan their 
operations, are always heavily armed, and attack without warning. Present school security 
practices propagated by government officials are inadequately modeled to defend against 
this attack typology. 
Most schools have intrinsic vulnerabilities due to their predictable schedules and 
receptive environments. Furthermore, the consequences of a successful attack on a school 
 xi 
are considerable. These elements, as well as a principal emphasis on resilience and 
recovery rather than prevention and mitigation, increase the risk to targeted schools. This 
research emphasizes these dangers and introduces the transformation framework needed 
to improve school security. A focus on interdependent perimeter security systems, 
comprised of essential components, will allow responding law enforcement personnel the 
valuable time needed to disrupt an attack. Additionally, this confluence of security 
components can be appropriately deployed regardless of geographical location. 
The establishment of a national school security standard, complete with 
guidelines and oversight, would convert the present school security narrative and 
emphasize strategic security planning for the education enterprise. Directing security 
professionals from component agencies of the Department of Homeland Security to work 
collaboratively with academic partners is an effective primary objective to ensure an 
equitable level of protection for all students and faculty.  
The implementation of national standard directing school security efforts faces 
numerous challenges as it has the potential to disrupt the academic learning environment, 
impede intergovernmental relations, and project financial obligations to local school 
districts. Overcoming these challenges requires coalition support from a broad range of 
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The heartless attack on the Sandy Hook Elementary School should serve as a 
tipping point for school security policy. School shootings are a rare but terrifying 
occurrence and the sensationalized media accounts that follow create significant angst in 
many communities.1 Most parents trust the education enterprise to teach their children in 
a safe environment. The expectation of safety is a significant burden for school officials 
and recent events suggest a considerable policy gap exists. The overreliance on armed 
guards is a concept with unquantifiable results. What is missing is the practical 
application of strategies designed to defend the external perimeter of a school and prevent 
the attack from occurring. This concept of utilizing physical and technological 
components aligned in an interdependent security system is prevalent in other industries 
and could be quickly modified to bolster the protection needed for school buildings.2 
Some component agencies of the Department of Homeland Security, such as the 
United States Secret Service and the Federal Protective Service, routinely use perimeter 
security systems to fulfill their protective responsibilities.3 Some components of these 
systems are overt, such as bollards, fencing, and armed guards, while other components 
are more covert, such as CCTV, magnetic door locks, and panic alarms. All of the 
systems are devised to prevent an attack, and the interdependency of the selected 
components creates redundancies that provide decision makers with valuable time. 
This research project focuses on the threat of mass murder perpetrated on a school 
community by a hostile intruder and promotes the strategic development of a policy that 
will offer capable defenses against both mass murders and terrorists. This emphasis is 
1 Ronald Burns and Charles Crawford, “School Shootings, the Media, and Public Fear: Ingredients for 
a Moral Panic,” Crime, Law and Social Change 32,, no. 2 (1999): 147–168. 
2 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of 
Terrorist Attacks and School Shootings, Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series (FEMA-428) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2012). 
3 Shawn Reese and Lorraine H. Tong, Federal Building and Facility Security (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2010). 
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largely because 31 percent of all mass murder attempts in this country occur at primary 
and secondary educational facilities.4 School shootings, such as the attack on the Sandy 
Hook Elementary School, are considered “acts of terrorism without an ideological core.”5 
Unlike school violence perpetrated by students, the mass murder of children by an 
offender unaffiliated with the school devastates entire communities and indirectly creates 
panic throughout the nation. 
Additionally, understanding the perpetrator’s motivation is difficult as most 
assailants fitting this category take their own lives upon the arrival of law enforcement 
officers thereby limiting comprehension of their motivation.6 The necessity to delay and 
disrupt the mechanics of an attack should begin with a defended perimeter that provides 
valuable time for both decision makers at the school and responding law enforcement. 
Presently, there are approximately 130,000 schools in the United States 
responsible for educating nearly 55 million children, nearly 20 percent of the population.7 
Additionally, there are approximately 14,000 school districts with administrative 
personnel responsible for developing and implementing policy.8 Some of these 
institutions have a high level of security, while others have none. This divergence creates 
inequality among students and teachers. Without national security standards, economic 
inequality will become the predominant variable permitting affluent school districts to 
offer students a safer learning environment and faculty members a more secure 
workplace. This project focuses on the public education system in the United States with 
an emphasis on securing often-defenseless elementary schools. The research 
4 Jim Powell, “What Should You do if You’re Threatened by a Mass Murderer?” Forbes September 4, 
2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jimpowell/2013/09/04/what-should-you-do-if-youre-threatened-by-a-
mass-murderer/. 
5 Jonathan Fast, Ceremonial Violence: Understanding Columbine and Other School Rampage 
Shootings (New York: The Overlook Press, 2008), 333. 
6 Glenn W. Muschert, “Research in School Shootings,” Sociology Compass 1,, no. 1 (2007): 60–80. 




                                                 
demonstrates that elementary schools lack the most security as most districts focus their 
attention on the middle school and high school populations. 9 
Vulnerabilities often exist at private schools and institutions of higher learning as 
well but resources are more available to manage risk. Increases in private school 
enrollment following school shootings demonstrate that parents seemingly assume tuition 
payments translate to safer classrooms.10 Additionally, schools in rural settings may be 
disadvantaged by delayed law enforcement response times furthering the need for a 
security system designed to delay the onset of an attack.11 
The federal government recognizes the inherent vulnerabilities associated with 
most schools and has allocated financial resources to state governments through grant 
programs offered by both the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of 
Justice.12 Many of these grant programs help school districts pay for armed school 
resource officers. Other grant programs require school administrators to complete a 
vulnerability assessment of their school building prior to applying for the desired 
funding.13 Additionally, the federal government offers notional assistance through the 
publication of reports and best practice guides. This research project investigates the need 
for the Department of Homeland Security to make the prevention of school shootings a 
homeland security policy priority, similar to border security, cybersecurity, and airport 
security.  
The overall intent of this research project is to examine the need for a national 
school security standard while evaluating the existing school security practices, the attack 
typologies, the intrinsic and extrinsic risk, and the sometimes-indifferent academic 
9 Brad A. Myrstol, “Public Perceptions of School Resource Officer (SRO) Programs,” Western 
Criminology Review 12,, no. 3 (2011). 
10 Rahi Abouk and Scott Adams, “School Shootings and Private School Enrollment,” 2010, University 
of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/rabouk/www/School_shooting_note-2.pdf. 
11 School Safety in the 21st Century: Adapting to New Security Challenges Post 9-11I (Chicago, IL: 
National Strategy Forum, 2004), School Security, 
http://www.schoolsecurity.org/school_terrorism_NSF.pdf. 
12 Cheryl K. Chumley, “Obama Shifts $45 Million for Armed Cops in Schools—A La NRA,” The 
Washington Times, September 30, 2013. 
13 U.S. Department of Education, A Guide to School Vulnerability Assessments: Key Principles for 
Safe Schools (Washington, DC: Office of Safe and Drug Free Schools, 2008). 
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culture. This research project presents a strategic policy proposal to help protect schools 
from armed assailants who are intent on mass murder and organized terrorists who target 
schoolchildren.  
Historically, hostile intruders determined to mass murder children account for 
only 25 percent of the attacks on all schools in the United States. 14 Admittedly, students 
directing their rage toward their peers or a faculty member commit most school 
shootings. Previous government studies have provided insight and direction to 
administrators, helping them defend against this “insider” threat. 15 Unfortunately, there 
is a lack of information available concerning the threat posed by adult assailants focused 
on attacking schools. The 2012, attack on the Sandy Hook Elementary School and the 
recently thwarted attack on a school in a suburb of Atlanta, Georgia emphasize the nature 
of this unpredictable danger.16  Lastly, this research illustrates the economic and tactical 
benefit of a perimeter security system designed utilizing interdependent components and 
implemented to provide law enforcement with the precious time needed to respond to a 
violent school encounter.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Could a national school security standard make America’s education system 
safer? 
1. Secondary Questions 
• What would the design and implementation of a national school security 
standard entail?  
• How could local school districts and state governments with constrained 
resources implement this standard?  
14 Muschert, “Research in School Shootings,” 60–80. 
15 U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of Education, The Final Report and Findings of the 
Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of Education, 2002). 
16 Catherine E. Shoichet and Tristan Smith, “Police: Gunman Wielded AK-47 Inside Georgia School; 
No One Injured,” CNN, August 20, 2913, http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/20/us/georgia-school-
gunshots/index.html. 
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C. PROBLEM SPACE 
The existing security practices in many of our nation’s schools are not designed to 
defend against the threat posed by an armed intruder.  Schools are attractive targets 
primarily because they are powerful social symbols, and they typically lack the levels of 
physical security commonly found at airports, government buildings, and military 
institutions.17  
Most schools are welcoming environments intended for academic and social 
development. Unfortunately, this accessibility provides great opportunity for intruders 
with malicious intentions. 18 Educators possessing limited security acumen and 
constrained budgets are tasked with defending their domain by merely locking doors and 
sheltering their students in place. 19 This standard practice may be an effective initial 
procedure, but it fails to meet the expectation of security held by most parents.20 
The ineffectiveness of this security measure was most recently demonstrated 
during the attack in December 2012 on the elementary school in Newtown, Connecticut. 
Upon arriving at the school’s front entrance and encountering a locked door, the heavily 
armed intruder simply used his weapon to shoot out the closest panes of glass.21 This 
effortless action defeated the existing security plan in its entirety, providing the assailant 
with direct access to defenseless teachers and students. The existence of physical and 
structural security measures at the Sandy Hook Elementary School would have impeded 
this attack, increasing the opportunity for responding law enforcement officers to 
successfully engage and defeat the assailant.  
17 Michael Dorn and Chris Dorn, Innocent Targets: When Terrorism Comes to School (Macon, GA: 
Safe Havens International, 2005).  
18 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Primer to Design Safe School Projects. 
19 Hanover Research, Best Practices in School Security, Prepared for School XYZ (Washington, DC: 
Hanover Research, 2013).  
20 Associated Press, “Newtown Parents Seek More Focus on School Security,” The New Haven 
Register, May 16, 2013, Highbeam, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1A1-
3e1fe2749fb34bb986351b629dedf806.html. 
21 Connecticut Fusion Center, Sandy Hook Elementary School Shooting Incident Summary, 
Connecticut Intelligence Center (Hartford, CT: State of Connecticut Intelligence Center, 2012). 
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Although a rare occurrence, attacks like the one at the Sandy Hook Elementary 
School have failed to produce meaningful, results-based discourse regarding the security 
of our nation’s schools. These types of attacks overwhelm local communities and 
indirectly create panic throughout the country.22 The national significance of mass 
casualty events like the attack on the Sandy Hook Elementary School is underscored by 
the resources allocated for recovery and the attention paid by pundits and politicians. 
Following this attack, vigorous debate ensued regarding gun rights and mental health 
registries, with little focus on school security. The federal government offered school 
districts additional security recommendations as well as grant funding for school resource 
officers, school psychologists, and social workers.23  Federal grant dollars with an 
expiration date often fund the school resource officers, thus limiting their permanence 
and long-term usefulness.24 Leaders missed an opportunity to focus national attention on 
the necessity of physical security practices designed to harden vulnerabilities and defend 
against perimeter intrusion.25  
The purpose of this research is to investigate whether the implementation of a 
national school security standard would make America’s education system safer. This 
proposal will focus on publically funded primary schools due to that population’s high 
vulnerability. This research will also focus on defending against external threats, such as 
those posed by school related mass murder and organized terrorist attacks, rather than on 
attacks perpetrated by students. The argument for standardization serves to balance 
inequality between rural and/or under privileged and urban and or/affluent school 
districts.26 The status quo creates an environment wherein urban schools are often safer 
than rural schools due to quicker response from law enforcement and a pervasive culture 
22 Burns and Crawford, “School Shootings,” 147–168. 
23 White House, “Now is the Time; the President’s Plan to Protect our Children and our Communities 
by Reducing Gun Violence,” January 16, 2012, White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/preventing-gun-violence. 
24 Sara K. Satullo, “Bethlehem Area School District Hopes Grant Can Restore School Resource 
Officers,” The Express-Times, May 19, 2013. 
25 Keven Marier, “The 5 D’s of Outdoor Perimeter Security,” Security Magazine, March 5, 2012. 
26 Jason P. Nance, “School Security Considerations after Newtown,” The Stanford Law Review, 65, 
no. 103 (2013).  
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of indifference toward security. Additionally, affluent school districts may be able to 
afford security improvements while resource constrained districts cannot. This project 
will recommend affordable primary strategies to help negate this inequality. 
A secondary objective of this research will be to illustrate the effectiveness and 
relevance of physical security procedures presently utilized within the framework of the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan.27 There is already an effective template 
containing target hardening strategies for other critical structures that could be modified 
to function within the educational community and adequately address concerns of cost 
and appearance. Building a consensus and receiving the approval of affected stakeholders 
will be essential for successful implementation.  
The majority of research available on this subject does not advocate for structural 
security enhancements at schools chiefly because of esthetics, costs, and the concerns of 
policymakers and school administrators regarding changing the desired culture of a 
welcoming environment to a fortressed facility.  This research will explore the 
practicality of a national school security standard emphasizing the effectiveness and 
fiscal benefit of structural security planning.  
 
27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to 
Enhance Protection and Resiliency (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the literature related to school security reveals significant 
vulnerabilities common in many of our nation’s schools. This analysis also reveals a 
wealth of published resources that provides school districts with security strategies and 
examples of best practices. The literature demonstrates a historically reactive approach to 
school security with a concentration on consequence management rather than prevention.  
Finally, this review confirms that the absence of physical security measures and target-
hardening methods creates opportunities for assailants committed to mass murder and 
terror.  
Although there are several different categories of murder, this research project 
focuses on mass murder because of its devastating impact on communities. Concurrently, 
this project also examines the readiness of our country to manage a terrorist attack on our 
school system.  Mass murder is defined as “the murder of four or more victims, occurring 
in one location at approximately the same time, as a single episodic act.”28 Similar to 
terrorists, mass murder suspects do not attempt to avoid detection and capture, instead 
they are likely to commit suicide or be killed by responding authorities.29  
The literature draws distinctions between mass murder suspects and ideologically 
inspired terrorists.  A Congressional Research Service report from March 2013 titled, 
Public Mass Shootings in the United States: Selected Implications for Federal Public 
Health and Safety Policy, reveals that most mass murders act alone, are not inspired by a 
radical ideology, and often do not communicate their destructive intentions to anyone. 30  
In a research paper entitled, Mass Murder: Causes, Classification, and 
Prevention, Dr. James L. Knoll IV proffers that “the existing research base suggests that 
factors common to mass murder include extreme feelings of anger and revenge, social 
28 John Klofas, Summary of Research on Mass Murder (Rochester, NY: Rochester Institute of 
Technology: Center for Public Safety Initiatives, 2009). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Jerome P. Bjelopera, Erin Bagalman, Sarah W. Caldwell, Kristin M. Finklea, and Gail McCallion, 
Public Mass Shootings in the United States: Selected Implications for Federal Public Health and Safety 
Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013). 
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alienation, rumination on violent revenge fantasies, variable psychiatric illness, 
precipitating social stressors, and significant planning before the offense.”31 In his paper 
entitled, Research in School Shootings, Glenn Muschert classified this type of killer as an 
adult male with no affiliation to the selected school. He defined the motivation for these 
types of attacks to gain power or exact revenge and explained that the selection of the 
targeted school is due primarily to the symbolic significance of the institution.32 
The findings of The Safe School Initiative, a collaborative report published by the 
United States Secret Service and the Department of Education, concurs with Dr. Knoll’s 
assessment that most assailants engage in certain pre-attack behaviors. One such indicator 
is pre-operational surveillance wherein suspects assess the vulnerability of their potential 
target prior to attacking. 33 However, this report also states that student attackers are 
likely to communicate their plans with at least one person prior to committing their 
violent act.34 
Mass murder at a school creates palpable fear in a community.  Authors 
Christopher Ferguson, Mark Coulson, and Jane Barnett wrote of this fact in their 
collaborative paper entitled, Psychological Profiles of School Shooters: Positive 
Directions and One Big Wrong Turn. This public fear usually results in rash strategies 
such as the profiling of students, searching for warning signs of future attacks. These 
appraisals may be beneficial in incidences of school violence committed by students but 
has limited value against an armed intruder invading a school intent on massacring 
children.35 Dr. Jonathan Fast concurs with this assessment of fear in his book, 
Ceremonial Violence: Understanding Columbine and Other School Rampage Shootings. 
31 James L. Knoll, “Mass Murder: Causes, Classification, and Prevention” (Philadelphia, PA: 
Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 2012), 777.  
32 Muschert, Research in School Shootings, 60–80. 
33 U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education, The Final Report. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Christopher Ferguson, Mark Coulson and Jane Barnett, “Psychological Profiles of School Shooters: 
Positive Directions and One Big Wrong Turn,” Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations,, no. 11 (2011): 1–17. 
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He acknowledges the damage sustained by communities after a mass casualty shooting 
and communicates the detrimental impact on the national psyche.36 
The literature advocates for preparedness against a terrorist attack as radically 
inspired terrorists have publicized their intent to attack American schoolchildren.37  
Liberty University doctoral candidate Michael W. M. Dube addresses this risk in his 
dissertation entitled, Rhode Island School Terrorist Attack Preparedness. Dube’s 
research, although focused on preparedness levels in Rhode Island, affirmed that our 
nation’s schools are practical targets for terrorist attacks primarily because they 
accommodate children in large numbers and operate on predictable schedules, making the 
execution of an attack fairly simple.38 His research concluded a lack of emergency 
preparedness standards and professional security arrangements continue to make schools 
vulnerable to attack.39 
In her book What Terrorists Want, Understanding the Enemy, Containing the 
Threat, political scientist and author Louise Richardson also substantiates the threat to 
American schoolchildren. Professor Richardson explains al-Qaeda’s rationalization for 
targeting defenseless children stems from their perception of the brutal impact of 
American economic sanctions in Iraq.40  
Concurring with Dube and Richardson and addressing the psychological impact 
of such an attack, authors Mark Brandenburg and James L. Regens published an article in 




36 Fast, Ceremonial Violence, 333. 
37 Ben Venzke and Aimee Ibrahim, Al-Qaeda’s Advice for Mujahideen in Iraq: Lessons Learned in 
Afghanistan (Alexandria, VA: IntelCenter, 2003). 
38 Michael W. M. Dube, “Rhode Island School Terrorist Attack Preparedness” (PhD diss., Liberty 
University, Lynchburg, VA, 2012). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Louise Richardson, What Terrorist Want, Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New 
York: Random House, 2006). 
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children might be targeted by terrorists is evidenced by the fact that children who have 
been placed in danger, injured or killed generate an enormous emotional impact on the 
community and in the media.”41  
Retired public safety administrator and author Eric Shoemaker volunteers a more 
restrained approach in his article, Terrorism in American Schools: The First of All Fears. 
Shoemaker contends the likelihood of a terrorist attack on an American school is 
minimal. He concludes that risk management strategies should be devised and 
implemented to address threats from a more historical perspective.42 Because students 
have committed the majority of school attacks in our country, there is not much literature 
explaining the targeting of schools by adult assailants. 
Michael and Chris Dorn, authors of the book, Innocent Targets, When Terrorism 
Comes to School, generally agree with Shoemaker. They confirm the threat to American 
schoolchildren but also deftly explain why the targeting of schools by terrorists are rare 
events and therefore require measured responses.43 They contend that terrorist 
organizations that intentionally victimize schoolchildren run the risk of alienating the 
people, groups, and governments that provide them meaningful support. Additionally, the 
Dorns postulate that attacks directed at schoolchildren will most likely accelerate 
counterterrorism efforts against them.44  
Author and political scientist Max Abrams shares this opinion. In his article, 
“Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” he explains the key variable for terrorist success has 
always been target selection.45 Abrams argues attacks on civilian targets would be an 
impediment to a terrorist group’s pursuit of their policy objectives. 46 
41 Mark Brandenburg and James Regens, “Terrorist Attacks Against Children: Vulnerabilities, 
Management Principles and Capability Gaps,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
3,, no. 4 (2006). 
42 Eric Shoemaker, Terrorism in American Schools: The First of all Fears (Alexandria, VA: Public 
Entity Risk Institute, 2013). 
43 Dorn and Dorn, Innocent Targets. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Max Abrahms, Why Terrorism Does Not Work (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, 2006). 
46 Ibid. 
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The National School Safety Center (NSSC), established by U.S. presidential 
mandate in 1984, now operates as an independent non-profit organization serving schools 
and communities worldwide providing training in the area of school safety.47  In 2004, 
after the terrorist attack on a school in Beslan, Russia that claimed the life of 186 
innocent schoolchildren, the NSSC published a report making the following claim:  
To date, no U.S. school has been the target of an international terrorist attack. 
However, schools could be considered viable terrorist targets for the following reasons:  
• An attack at a school would instill fear and panic nationwide.  
• An attack on a school could promote the reputation and power of a 
terrorist/group.  
• An attack at a school would warrant national media coverage.  
• Schools provide an essential community service. About one-quarter of the 
nation’s population attends school each school day.  
• Schools symbolize America and our future.  
• Many schools remain easy targets due to their accessibility, vulnerability 
and prominence  in the community.48 
In 2004, shortly after the Beslan massacre, United States Department of 
Education, Deputy Secretary Eugene Hickok sent a letter to school officials nationwide 
suggesting the following procedures be implemented immediately:  
…secure locks for all external and internal doors and windows; install 
window and external door protections with quick-release capability; 
establish a safe area within the school for assembly and shelter during 
emergencies; apply a protective coating on windows in facilities that face 
roadways; establish and review of crisis management plans; and report 
suspicious activity to law enforcement.49   
This appears to have been the first time the federal government directed local 
school districts to take security action yet no information was available in the literature to 
appraise the level of national compliance with this mandate.  
47 National School Safety Center, Safeguarding Schools against Terror (Washington, DC: National 




                                                 
The last decade has witnessed an accelerated effort to increase school security 
awareness and the federal government has provided administrators with substantial 
information. Pamphlets, such as the Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide 
for Schools and Communities, focus school officials on crisis management planning and 
directs them to consult with first responders and other community representatives to 
develop mitigation strategies defending against an array of hazards.50  Unfortunately, this 
planning document does not accentuate the threat from individuals’ intent on mass 
murder.  
Similarly, in the Guide To School Vulnerability Assessments: Key Principles for 
Safe Schools, Department of Education representatives offer school administrators 
guidance on assessing vulnerabilities at their schools. Regrettably, this tool is focused 
more on weather related dangers and dedicates only one paragraph to the threat of 
terrorism.51  
A lack of security expertise, fiscally restrained school budgets, and federal 
agencies intent on providing schools with overwhelming amounts of planning documents 
appear detrimental to the objective of making schoolchildren safer. This assertion is 
substantiated in a 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report.52 The report 
claims “school officials identified challenges stemming from a lack of equipment, 
training for staff, and personnel with expertise in the area of emergency planning as 
obstacles to implementing recommended practices.”53 This same report also stresses the 
need for better communication between school officials, parents, and first responders and 
testifies that only 32 states possess crisis management plans.54 
This literature review also revealed peripheral involvement from the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Infrastructure Protection. National Critical 
50 U.S. Department of Education, Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and 
Communities (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2007). 
51 U.S. Department of Education, A Guide to School Vulnerability Assessments. 
52 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Emergency Management: Status of School Districts’ 




                                                 
Infrastructure is defined as “the backbone of our nation's economy, security and 
health.”55 However, initial sector identification designation excluded our nation’s school 
system.56 In 2006, the Department of Education and DHS collaborated on the inclusion 
of all schools within the framework of National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).57 
The Education Facilities Sub Sector was established and now provides infrastructure 
protection guidance to “all public and private K–12 schools (including charter schools); 
public and private higher education schools and institutions; U.S. Department of Defense 
schools; and American-sponsored overseas schools assisted by the U.S. Department of 
State.58  
DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate recently published a comprehensive 
document as part of its Building and Infrastructure Protection Series. The stated purpose 
of this primer is to provide school administrators with the basic principles and techniques 
needed to make schools safe from terrorist attacks. The document offers specific 
instruction regarding a diverse range of dangers and also provides information to the 
structural design community ensuring newly constructed schools could provide enhanced 
security while assuring the school remains “functional and esthetically pleasing.”59  
Although drafted to explore the business relationships between DHS and private 
sector businesses, the article titled, “The Challenge of Protecting Critical Infrastructure” 
makes a salient point. The authors, students at the Wharton Business School of the 
University of Pennsylvania, Center for Risk Management and Decision Processes, are 
critical of the government’s approach to infrastructure protection proffering that 
“extraordinary levels of coordination of many organizations, public and private, will be 
55 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “What is Critical Infrastructure?” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure.   
56 Joshua B. Bolton, Development of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7 Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Plans to Protect Federal Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources 
(Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 2004). 
57 U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Education, Education Facilities 
Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the Government Facilities Sector-Specific Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Education, 2010). 
58 Ibid.  
59 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Primer to Design Safe School Projects. 
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required to secure any improved level of prevention, response, and recovery.”60 The 
literature examined for this review suggests this is especially accurate when addressing 
school security.  
The NIPP empowers sector specific agencies (SSA) to coordinate emergency 
planning efforts with partners at the state and local levels but fails to mandate school 
security procedures citing our country’s highly decentralized system of education. 61 
Therefore, it is held that the general authority to create and administer public schools is 
reserved for the states. Additionally, there is no national school system in this country 
and the Department of Education does not dictate curricula.62 This environment requires 
the SSA to provide only notional assistance regarding school security. 
On more than one occasion, the federal government has taken legislative action to 
protect the populace when states have failed to act.  For instance, in 1968, Congress 
passed the Bank Protection Act.  The intent of this legislation was to “discourage 
robberies, burglaries and larcenies committed against financial institutions.”63 The act 
required physical security measures be implemented and maintained to deter and defeat 
would be criminal networks targeting our local financial institutions.64 Presently, a 
national security standard exists in all federally insured financial institutions guaranteeing 
a level of safety for our currency. It is time for a similar standard to be applied to protect 
our children. 
There is a gap in the literature concerning the most recent threat to schools. The 
literature does not offer pertinent research on adult attackers without a known affiliation 
to the targeted school. The literature on this topic demonstrates an obvious need for more 
federal government engagement and that funding alone is not the answer. Numerous 
60 Philip Auerswald, Lewis M. Branscomb, Todd M. LaPorte, and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, “The 
Challenge of Protecting Critical Infrastructure,” working paper 05-11, Wharton Business School, 
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 2005. 
61 Ibid. 
62 U.S. Department of Education, Education in the United States: A Brief Overview (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Education, 2005). 
63 Office of Thrift Supervision, Examination Handbook, Compliance Laws and Regulations: Bank 
Protection Act (Washington, DC: Office of Thrift Supervision, 1999). 
64 Ibid. 
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limiting factors exist, including social and political constraints. For a variety of reasons, 
many school districts nationwide have not developed satisfactory emergency 
management plans with cogent methods designed to counter mass murder and the threat 
of terrorism. Physical security components have been overlooked in favor of armed 
resource officers funded through grant procedures. School administrators are often 
incapable of conducting proper vulnerability assessments and the tasking of subject 
matter experts is apparently necessary.  Simple environmental design strategies and the 
employment of physical security components can be effectively utilized to reduce risk in 
all of our nation’s schools. 
A. RESEARCH METHOD 
This thesis will investigate the practicality of a national school security standard 
mandating the implementation of physical security measures designed to reduce the risk 
of an attack by an armed intruder.  The need for the integration of armed law enforcement 
and mental health professionals will be addressed but will not be the focus of this 
research. I will appraise existing school security options and examine current practices 
utilizing data provided by literature. The overall purpose of this research project is to 
proffer a strategy that will dramatically improve school security while minimizing the 
intrusion on the educational environment. Eugene Bardach’s book, A Practical Guide for 
Policy Analysis, The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving, will serve as the 
methodological framework for this policy development project. Professor Bardach 
identifies eight important steps to policy analysis and this project will utilize all of these 
steps in an attempt to address a significant policy gap.65 
1. Define the Problem 
The American education system is vulnerable to attack from hostile intruders with 
malicious intentions due primarily to their predictable schedules, numerous access points, 
minimal security components, and welcoming environments. One of the associated 
65 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis, the Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving, 4th ed. (New York: CQ Press College, 2011), 176. 
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problems is that school administrators and local governments lack the training, funding, 
and expertise needed to adopt effective security strategies.  
2. Assemble Some Evidence  
The evidence used to support this project will be grounded in literature such as 
government issued reports, journals, and books written on the topic of school safety. An 
analogous evaluation of the physical security features present in select government 
buildings will be performed as well as an analysis of the adaptation of fire suppression 
equipment in school buildings.  
3. Construct the Alternatives  
During the development of this policy proposal, I will evaluate the following 
alternatives: training and arming teachers to defend schools from attack, mandating the 
employment of armed school resource officers, and implementing physical security 
measures, and target hardening strategies specifically designed to secure the venue’s 
perimeter. There will be variations among these alternatives due to available funding, 
political appeasement, legality, and acceptance by key stakeholders. 
4. Select the Criteria  
Because this proposal focuses on bolstering the security of defenseless children 
and their teachers at school, efficiency will be the primary evaluative criteria utilized. 
Unless tested by an attacker, the necessary feedback loop for the systems efficiency will 
be missing. This project will also examine values such as community, fairness, and 
equality and their relationship with current and proposed school security practices. 
Practical criteria, such as constitutionality and political acceptability, will also be 
analyzed with a focus on the strategic alliances necessary for successful policy 
implementation. 
5. Project the Outcomes   
This research project will construct credible policy outcome models that are 
established in social science and utilize security methodologies commonly employed in 
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other protected sectors. These models will incorporate alternative options combined with 
existing conditions that are commonly found in most schools. The research will also 
furnish realistic projections concerning the political feasibility of this policy along with 
an evaluation of undesirable side effects and possible implementation pitfalls.  
6. Confront the Trade-offs 
An assessment of the outcome models will determine the option with the greatest 
value proposition for the numerous constituents affected by this policy proposal. 
Financial resource allocation will initially serve as our commensurable metric; however, 
the need for political support will require a break-even analysis that estimates the 
acceptable levels of risk to schoolchildren. 
7. Decide  
The final stages of this research project will lead to contemplation about the 
conviction of this proposed policy. Evaluation of the research process and the analytic 
yield will be completed from the perspective of the decision maker. Modifications to the 
proposal will be made during this step to answer any uncertainties.  
8. Tell Your Story  
This final step requires the ability to present a clear, concise, realistic thesis 
supporting the proposed policy. Awareness of both our audience and political factions 
that may pervert this project is critical. Our policy recommendations will be factually 
supported and will rebut possible objections to implementation.  
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III. SCHOOLS: OUR MOST CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. RECOGNITION OF THE DANGER 
The question regarding the vulnerabilities surrounding our nation’s schools is 
often debated after a tragedy like the event in Newtown, Connecticut last year. With the 
discourse focused on access to assault weapons and mental health information sharing, 
the recognition that a threat remains is often lost in the issue attention cycle.66 
Making school security a homeland security priority has already happened with 
incalculable results. Since 1999, the United States Government has spent more than 1 
billion dollars on school security efforts.67 The expenditures were dedicated to a 
nationwide school resource officer program.  This program provided a “maximum federal 
contribution up of to $125,000 per officer position” for the duration of the three-year 
grant period.68 After the grant period expired, many districts struggled to maintain this 
security component, but could not, thereby reducing their level of safety. Throughout the 
literature, the four key stakeholders in the education enterprise, the students, their parents, 
their teachers, and school administrators largely provide the assessment of the usefulness 
of this program. The students are generally undecided about the program but their parents 
appreciate the sense of elevated safety.69 Some faculty members appear supportive of the 
program, believing a uniformed law enforcement official helps curb student misconduct 
and enhance overall security.70 
During the same timeframe that federal resources were allocated to this program, 
active shooting incidents increased in the United States with schools representing 34 
66 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What Should Homeland Security Leaders be 
Talking About?” Homeland Security Affairs 2,, no. 2 (2006). 
67 U.S. Department of Justice, “COPS: Community Oriented Policing Services,” U.S. 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=34.  
68 Ibid. 
69 Myrstol, “Public Perceptions.” 
70 Ibid. 
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percent of the targeted venues.71 This statistic is not a criticism of this program however 
there is no research available demonstrating that the school resource officer position 
provides an appreciable level of security to a school. As an example, during the 
Columbine High School massacre in 1999, a school resource officer was assigned to the 
campus but could not mitigate the attack after exchanging gunfire with the suspects.72 
A survey conducted in 2010 by the Department of Education, found that 84 
percent of all public schools maintained a written response plan in the event of a shooting 
but only 52 percent of these schools had practiced the execution of the plan.73 The results 
of this survey demonstrate that a narrative already exists surrounding school shootings. 
Eighty-four percent of approximately 130,000 schools have written plans designed to 
help secure students and faculty members. If there were not practical threat recognition, 
these numbers would be much lower. 
Another indicator of the recognition of the threat to schools is their inclusion 
within the national critical infrastructure and key resource (CIKR) program. The next 
section will provide an overview of critical infrastructure and the education facilities sub-
sector.  
B. NATIONAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES 
Critical infrastructure is defined as the:  
…systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would 
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.74 
71 J. Pete Blair and M. Hunter Martaindale, “United States Active Shooter Events from 2000 to 2010: 
Training and Equipment Implications,” Police Forum, 2013, http://policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-
in-policing-series/Blair-UnitedStatesActiveShooterEventsfrom2000to2010Report-Final.pdf.  
72 Sandra J. Austin, “Lessons Learned from the Shootings at Columbine High School,” The Human 
Side of School Crises: A Public Entity Risk Institute Symposium, February 24–28, 2003, School Counselor 
Association, http://www.schoolcounselor.org/asca/media/asca/Crisis/columbine.pdf. 
73 White House, “Now is the Time.” 
74 Public Law 107-56, 107th Cong., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism [USA PATRIOT Act] Act of 2001, 1016 (e). 
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Although defined by the PATRIOT Act, the identification and requirement to 
secure our nation’s critical infrastructure actually pre-dates the terrorist attacks of 2001. 
Critical infrastructure was initially identified as physical and cyber-based systems 
necessary for the minimum operations of the both the economy and the government. 
These included communication systems, electrical systems, banking and financial 
networks, transportation and water systems and governmental emergency services.75 
In 1998, President William Clinton recognized the need to address potential 
vulnerabilities in these systems and issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63). 
This executive order directed the full resources of the federal government to work toward 
the development of mitigation strategies for attacks on identified critical infrastructure.76 
The evolution of this federal security strategy led to the recognition of another set of 
national assets ascribed the term “key resources.” Key resources are considered publicly 
or privately controlled assets essential to the minimal operations of the economy and 
government.77 
President George W. Bush expanded the scope of PDD-63 in 2003 with the 
issuance of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD 7). This mandate created 
a national critical infrastructure protection policy and identified the Secretary of 
Homeland Security as the principal coordinator.78 The purpose of HSPD 7 was to protect 
the county from the threat of terrorist attack, but President Bush also directed agencies to 
develop “strategic security enhancements, and devise tactical security improvements that 
can be rapidly implemented to deter, mitigate, or neutralize potential attacks.”79 During 
policy development, CIKR were categorized into specific sectors. Federal agencies were  
 
 
75 White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63, Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(Washington, DC: White House, 1998), 2. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (2002): 2(9), U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf. 




                                                 
then assigned to each of these sectors and instructed to establish collaborative 
partnerships, conduct vulnerability assessments, and ensure the implementation of 
successful preventative measures.  
HSPD 7 led to the development of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP). The NIPP sets the parameters for the national risk management strategy and 
provides a coordinated approach utilized “to establish national priorities, goals, and 
requirements for infrastructure protection so that funding and resources are applied in the 
most effective manner.”80  
The efforts to safeguard our nation’s CIKRs continue to evolve and mature. 
Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), issued by President Barack Obama, has 
superseded HSPD 7. This directive refines critical sectors, clarifies responsibilities, and 
promotes the concept of resilience. It also directs agencies to “reduce vulnerabilities, 
minimize consequences, identify and disrupt threats, and hasten response and recovery 
efforts related to critical infrastructure.”81  
There are 16 CIKR sectors recognized by PPD-21, they are: chemical, 
commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, defense industrial base, 
emergency services, energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government 
facilities, healthcare and public health, information technology, nuclear reactors, 
materials, and waste, transportation systems, water and wastewater.82 Each sector has 
been assigned a federal department or agency to serve as the sector specific agency (SSA) 
responsible for compliance with NIPP based initiatives and is designated to provide 
knowledge and expertise regarding security and resilience.83 Core tenants of the NIPP 
include risk-based prevention, asset protection, and preparedness strategies with the goal 
of reducing sector vulnerabilities.84 
80 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
81 White House, Presidential Policy Directive PPD 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2013). 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
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In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security recognized schools and 
universities as CIKR and a collective focus on protective methodology in the educational 
environment emerged. The Bush administration acknowledged that the threat to 
defenseless schoolchildren required involvement from the federal government.85 The 
education facilities sector (EFS) was created and became a subsector of the government 
facilities sector. The United States Department of Education was tasked with 
coordinating security efforts and providing information to the Department of Homeland 
Security regarding compliance with the goals established by the NIPP.86  
The EFS is expected to create partnerships with state and local entities and 
provide school administrators with crisis management guidance on school security 
measures. As the SSA, the Department of Education establishes objectives in an attempt 
to have all schools create and practice emergency management protocols. 87 
1. Defining the Threat 
The NIPP defines risk as “the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from 
an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated 
consequences.”88 The assessment process of individual CIKR sectors utilizes three 
variables to assign a risk score. These variables are: threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence.  The applicable scores assist decision makers with the resource allocation 
needed to reduce the risk to more acceptable levels. 
The risk management framework employed by the NIPP focuses on the numerous 
hazards that threaten sectors of CIKR. Some of the hazards are weather related, such as 
tornados and hurricanes; others are manmade hazards, such as the threat posed by active 
shooters and terrorism. A commonality among these hazards is that the scope of the 
threat to the sector is often not known in advance, which makes prevention much more 
85 Protecting our Schools: Federal Efforts to Strengthen Community Preparedness and Response, Full 
Hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Kenneth Trump). 
86 U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Education, Education Facilities 
Sector. 
87 Ibid. 
88 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
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difficult.89 The EFS also employs the NIPP risk assessment methodology as part of a 
comprehensive defense strategy for school security planning and acknowledges that 
schools are at risk for both natural and manmade hazards.90  
DHS defines threat as it pertains to school security as “any indication, 
circumstance, or event with the potential to inflict harm and cause losses.” 91 To calculate 
the risk associated with a terrorist attack on a sector, the probability of the threat is 
estimated based on the likelihood of the attack as well as the intent and capability of the 
assailant.92 Presently, the Department of Education relies largely on independent 
vulnerability assessments to discern the significance of this threat. EFS planning 
documents state that the possibility exists for the consideration of sector-wide 
assessments on all education facilities predicated on future conditions.93 
Terrorists would relish an opportunity to demonstrate the inability of our 
government to protect its citizens and garner excessive media coverage of their attack 
helping to advance their malevolent ideology.94 The recent attacks in Boston by radically 
inspired brothers’ underscore their tactical capability. Motivation and justification for 
targeting our children can be directly linked to U.S. foreign policy doctrine. Recent 
collateral damage from drone strikes, as well as the economic sanctions on Iraq in the late 
1990s, have claimed the lives of thousands of children in the Middle East.95 
An advanced warning of an attack from terrorists or a hostile intruder committed 
to mass murdering children is not likely. Historically, individuals and not groups have 
89 Ibid. 
90 U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Education, Education Facilities 
Sector. 
91 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Primer to Design Safe School Projects. 
92 National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to Enhance Protection and Resiliency, 32. 
93 U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Education, Education Facilities 
Sector. 
94 Dorn and Dorn, Innocent Targets. 
95 Richardson, What Terrorist Want, 219. 
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committed most attacks on schools.96 The anonymity afforded the lone assailant 
significantly hinders the ability to reduce this threat. 
2. Assessing the Vulnerability 
Vulnerability assessments measure the likelihood of a successful attack on a 
specific target.97 Organizational vulnerability is a significant element of a useful 
assessment and in most schools it evaluates the venue’s size, configuration, and 
procedural routines assessing exploitation opportunities for attackers.98  The enrollment 
statistics offered earlier in this research project demonstrates the considerable security 
burden facing the SSA. An additional problem is that attackers perform their own 
assessments, choosing their targets based on “verified weaknesses in those target’s 
defenses.”99 
The assessment of vulnerability is a very important component in risk 
management. With the probability of extreme consequence and a consistent threat, the 
evaluation of vulnerability becomes the only subjective variable in a risk management 
equation.100 Security professionals from DHS have made a macro assessment of our 
nation’s schools and deemed them to be highly vulnerable to attack and lacking the 
capacity to prevent a hostile intruder from entering and causing mass casualties.101 
Prior to the attack on the Sandy Hook Elementary school, the SSA directed school 
administrators with limited training to estimate vulnerability at their schools. The 
administrators were provided a variety of tools including checklists and web-based 
products to guide them through the process. However, teachers have chosen education as 
their professional discipline, not security, and they should not be required to conduct 
96 Jessie Klein, The Bully Society: School Shootings and the Crisis of Bullying in America’s Schools 
(New York: New York University Press, 2012). 
97 Douglas W. Hubbard, The Failure of Risk Management, Why it’s Broken and How to Fix It 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009). 
98 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Primer to Design Safe School Projects. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Hubbard, The Failure of Risk Management. 
101 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Primer to Design Safe School Projects. 
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these assessments.102 The NIPP requires SSAs to be accountable for compiling these 
vulnerability assessments and directs them to work with DHS personnel to review the 
results in an attempt to better understand the risks associated with the surveyed 
schools.103 Presently, DHS has directed CIKR security specialists referred to as 
protective security advisors to assist with the school assessment process.104  
Many schools are continuing to self-assess but these assessments are not yet 
mandatory, and there remains no consequence for non-compliance. Citing the highly 
decentralized education system in the United States, EFS planning documents stipulate 
that the ultimate responsibility for the protection of schoolchildren and faculty members 
belongs to local communities and individual states.105 Additionally, there is no 
requirement for schools to collaborate with their respective first responder community, 
and these partners are not universally involved in the evaluation process.106 The 
enormous size of our education system and the uniqueness of design inherent in many 
schools suggest that general assessments commonly found in checklists will lead to faulty 
outputs, ineffective strategies, and a waste of scarce resources.107  
3. The Consequence of Failure 
An attack on a school by an armed intruder is a historically rare event.108  Schools 
are considered safe places, and parents, teachers and students have an expectation of 
safety at schools. However, an attempted or successful attack could have significant 
implications not only on that specific district but the national psyche too. Resource 
allocation for security at schools is often weighed against the probability that an armed 
102 School Safety in the 21st Century: Adapting to New Security Challenges Post 9-11. 
103 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
104 Office of Infrastructure Protection, K-12 School Security Practices Guide (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013). 
105 U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Education, Education Facilities 
Sector. 
106 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Emergency Management. 
107 Hanover Research, Best Practices in School Security. 
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intruder would target a school for attack.109 The threat of a mass murder or terrorist attack 
on a school can be viewed as an outlier or “black swan” and for that reason objections to 
heightened security practices pervade the education community.  
A black swan refers to an event with a low probability of occurrence but extreme 
consequences.110 Economist and author Nassim Nicholas Taleb made this terminology 
popular by explaining unforeseen events in the financial sector. He contends that in order 
for an event to be classified as a black swan, the following three things must be present:  
• First, the event lies outside the realm of regular expectations.  
• Second, the event carries extreme consequences and  
• Third, hindsight is employed in an attempt to make the event explainable 
to key stakeholders.111 
Taken in its entirety, the application of Taleb’s probability theory to violent 
school incidents is questionable, but two of the attributes of the black swan theory exist in 
all school attacks. The consequences are always extreme as these mass casualty events 
impact hundreds of people. Families are forever changed by the death of a child and 
equally impacted are the lives of teachers and school administrators directly and 
indirectly involved in the event.112 Psychological studies have concluded that 
posttraumatic stress disorder is prevalent in victims, witnesses, first responders, and 
members of a community impacted by a mass murder at a school. 113 The extensive 
media coverage that follows these events adversely influences local and national morale, 
often creating uncertainty, panic and fear.114    
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There are also consequence economically to school attacks through post-incident 
litigation, insurance costs, and associated long-term recovery efforts.115 The financial 
assessments of the Sandy Hook attack are not yet available but approvals have been 
granted for the construction of a new elementary school to be built on the site of the 
previous school with a proposed cost of $60 million. 116Comparatively, a similar mass 
murder incident at Virginia Tech University in 2007 cost taxpayers approximately $48 
million. 117 
Additional consequences are propagated by fear and include disruptions to the 
educational environment impacting the student’s readiness and capacity to learn as well 
as the hiring and retention of teachers and staff members.118 During testimony to the 
Homeland Security Committee, author and school security professional Kenneth Trump 
made the following claim: 
Children cannot learn and teachers cannot teach to their maximum 
capability if they are worried about their personal safety. Education will 
cease as school-communities struggle to manage and recover from a 
critical incident, and the impact can be both severe and long-term.119  
The interruption of teaching future generations in American classrooms because 
of an attack from terrorists or other malicious actors would be catastrophic and 
detrimental to our national security.120 
The other condition of the black swan theory that is present in all attacks on 
schools is the application of hindsight. Post incident analysis often reveals signals that 
115 Joseph De Avila, “Sandy Hook Sees Rebound: Closure of School Where 26 were Killed 
Contributed to Village’s Economic Funk,” The Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2013. 
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were missed in the days preceding the attacks.121 The behavioral analysis of the attacker 
leads to additional reactionary procedures with very little focus on the prevention of 
additional attacks and no apparent plan for the peripheral threat presented by a hostile 
intruder.122 
Finally, the aspect of Taleb’s black swan theory that does not apply to school 
shootings is the premise that the event lies outside the realm of regular expectation.123  
Published documents by both DHS and the Department of Education providing school 
administrators with strategy and tactical plans to manage an attack on a school 
demonstrate an expectation does exist. These documents and numerous violent attacks on 
schools throughout the years prove these events should not be considered black swans 
and may have significant national security ramifications. 124 
C. HOMELAND AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
Education has always been an important facet of our culture and in today’s 
transnational economy the premium placed on education is significant.  The foundation 
of American national security is the strength of the economy and education is considered 
the vehicle for future stability.125  
The assertion that school shootings are black swan events can be countered with 
statistical outputs demonstrating an alarming increase in event frequency. An evaluation 
of school shootings over the last 30 years reveals an increase in events during each 
examined decade.126 Additionally, mass shootings in publically accessible areas continue  
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to confound first responders and frighten the public.127 The media irresponsibly classifies 
school shootings within a discourse of fear and suggests they are a threat to the safety of 
all children.128  
Feelings of fear, helplessness, and shock pervade entire communities when these 
traumatic events occur, and the unintended economic consequences of these events have 
not been effectively examined. For example, the horrific images of the slain children and 
faculty at the Sandy Hook school caused post-traumatic stress in both teachers and 
responding law enforcement personnel.129 Months after the attack some remain on 
administrative leave while others have taken sabbaticals to help them cope 
psychologically.130  
Although the majority of the literature on this topic focuses on the safety of the 
children, an unsafe workplace directly contributes to the high rate of attrition associated 
with the teaching profession.131 For example, many teachers at the Sandy Hook 
Elementary school perished by unselfishly placing their bodies between the shooter and 
their young students. 
Paradoxically, education is a necessary component for individuals to effectively 
learn to manage their fears. Due to the anxiety and distress associated with events such as 
the Sandy Hook massacre, the individual ability to control panic and overreaction is 
rooted in one’s own education. 132 It is counterintuitive to expect national levels of 
resilience if policy makers continue to ignore the vulnerabilities in our education system.  
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The correlation between the education enterprise, economic prosperity, and 
America’s national security gives credibility to the premise that school shootings, such as 
the Sandy Hook massacre, must become a homeland security policy priority. The 
following chapters will further stress this danger and proffer solutions to decrease 
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IV. BUILDING DEFENSE: ATTACK TYPOLOGY AND THE 
SANDY HOOK MASSACRE 
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF VIOLENT SCHOOL INCIDENCES 
The first recorded mass school shooting in the United States occurred at St. 
Mary’s Parochial School in Newburgh, New York on April 9, 1891 when a 70-year-old 
man armed with a shotgun, opened fire on a group of students in the playground.133 
Although none of the children or faculty members were killed, there were numerous 
injuries reported. This shocking attack was atypical for the time period as the majority of 
incidents involved students assaulting other students; however, it served as a predecessor 
to today’s instances of violence directed at schoolchildren. 
From 1979–2011 there were 191 school shootings killing 170 students and 110 
teachers; at least 397 students and 75 adults were also wounded in these attacks.134 
Additionally, the data reveals that 95 percent of the suspects are males and 25 percent are 
adults. 135 This information also includes data from shootings on college campuses, 
which is outside of the scope of this project but is offered to provide context. 
Violence in the educational setting is hardly a new phenomenon and most of the 
chronicled attacks are characterized as peer hostility.136 As education became more 
formalized, a greater focus has been placed on school violence. The administration of 
President James Carter was responsible for the elevation of education to a cabinet level 
department within the federal government.137 One of the missions of the newly formed 
Department of Education was to “identify major issues in education and focus national 
attention on them.”138 Soon afterward, school districts were inundated with surveys 
133 K12 Academic, “History of School Shootings in the United States,” K12 Academic, 
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attempting to accurately access school safety.139 This method of analysis was widely 
criticized due to its lack of standardization, and it produced an inaccurate final 
assessment of the threat of violence commonly found in schools.140  
Incidents of school shootings, before the early 1990s, were often linked to drug 
and gang activity and frequently affected only urban school districts.141 Administrations 
countered this violence with metal detection equipment and the presence of armed law 
enforcement officers. These tactical responses did not reduce the violence but simply 
moved the issue off of school property.142 The degrading security situation and its 
notoriety in the media created sufficient public anxiety leading to several national 
legislative initiatives. The realization that schools with their inherent vulnerabilities were 
becoming dangerous places is exhibited in laws such as the Safe and Drug-Free Schools 
Act of 1986 and the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.143 
The migration of school shootings from urban to rural school districts has 
significantly affected the intensity of the issue. These events were no longer considered 
linked to the gang and drug violence, which is commonly associated with inner city 
schools.144 The impact of a school shooting in suburban and rural settings transcended the 
primary victims and adversely affected entire communities.145  According to Norris, 
“Community members resent the media intrusion, the sense that they are being blamed 
for the violence, and the convergence of outsiders.”146 Additionally, the national media’s 
139 Dewey G. Cornell and Matthew J. Mayer, “Why do School Order and Safety Matter?” Educational 
Researcher 39,, no. 1 (2010), 7–15. 
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response to the frequency of school shootings that occurred in the 1990s caused 
significant public fear suggesting schools were no longer safe places for children.147 
National attention on school shootings has also generated significant academic 
interest. The increased angst in communities initiated a greater focus on preventing the 
violence. Social scientists and academics engaged the problem hoping to identify the root 
cause.148 The expanding interest in this field of study has been noteworthy and challenges 
the notion that these attacks are low risk events. In an article in Educational Researcher, 
it states, “A search of peer-reviewed journals restricted to the term school violence 
identified 3 articles in the 1970s, 10 in the 1980s, 84 in the 1990s, and 443 since 
2000.”149 In addition, recent search of school violence utilizing the Internet search engine 
Google Scholar identified more than two million published articles.150 
The landmark school shooting occurred on April 20, 1999 when two students 
executed a murderous attack on their high school, Columbine High School, in Littleton, 
Colorado (CO). This mass murder claimed the lives of 14 students and a teacher and 
injured numerous others.151 The two suspects committed suicide prior to their capture, 
but their heinous act and the national attention that followed created an extraordinary 
level of fear.152 Afterwards, President Clinton directed the United States Secret Service 
and the Department of Education to collaborate on a project examining the causation of 
school violence. This published report provided school administrators and law 
enforcement leadership with strategies for mitigating future attacks.153 The attack on 
Columbine High  
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 School was not the first mass school shooting in the United States, but it was the most 
important in shaping the national narrative about school violence, until the attack on the 
Sandy Hook Elementary school occurred.154 
B. TYPOLOGY OF ATTACKERS AND THE HOSTILE INTRUDER 
Understanding an adversary and his motivation is essential to designing and 
implementing defensive strategies to counter his tactics. Available historical data has 
assisted social scientists with the research needed to better understand these attacks and 
help define the attackers. Social scientist Glenn Muschert defines school attackers 
utilizing five different typologies: rampage shootings, mass shootings, terrorist attacks, 
targeted shootings, and government shootings.155 The primary commonality in his 
research on these typologies is that the evaluated incidences occurred at a school. In 
addition, the research on this topic reveals that mass shootings and terrorist attacks often 
require hostile intrusion into the perimeter of the school prior to the assailant committing 
the violence. Individuals that perform rampage and targeted shootings often have 
authorized access to their target location. The following section offers key elements of 
the four common typologies to include the condition of the perpetrator, his access to the 
school, and whether the victims were specifically targeted or selected for symbolic 
reasons.156 The identity of the shooters in the following examples will not be provided. In 
addition, the government shootings classification will not be addressed in this thesis. 
1. Rampage Shootings 
Rampage shootings have multiple victims and lack specific targeting. The 
perpetrator is often a member of the educational community, such as a student or 
employee.  The motive for attacking the school is largely symbolic and is designed as an 
attempt to attack the whole community.157 In addition, there is a revenge component with 
154 Altheide, “The Columbine Shootings and the Discourse of Fear.” 




                                                 
these types of attacks wherein the shooter attempts to attain power through violence of 
action.158 These attackers often perceive an injustice and feel compelled to act. Many 
rampage shootings occur in suburban or rural school districts, which often lack the 
resources commonly found in more urban settings.  
The Columbine High School massacre is an example of a rampage shooting. The 
two attackers were both members of the high school senior class, and they planned the 
massacre for more than a year.159 Their intention was to utilize improvised explosive 
devices to cause as many casualties as possible. The faulty devices forced the two killers 
to alter their strategy and utilize firearms and shotguns during the assault instead.160 They 
randomly executed several classmates and a faculty member before they eventually 
committed suicide.161 These two killers are not considered hostile intruders due to their 
enrollment at the institution at the time of the attack. 
2. Mass Murder 
Mass murder requires that three or more victims be killed during a single episode 
at approximately the same time and in the same location.162 This classification of killer is 
generally an adult male with no affiliation to the selected school. The motivation for the 
attack is often to gain power or exact revenge and the selection of the targeted school is 
due to the symbolic significance of the institution.163 
Mass murderers distinguish themselves from other killers by meticulously 
planning their operation.164 They are prepared with a powerful arsenal of weapons and 
ammunition. Furthermore, they perform target surveillance and execute their attacks 
158 Rocque, “Exploring School Rampage Shootings.” 
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during the daytime, and they do not seek to evade arrest.165 Many mass murderers are 
prepared to die during the event as a result of suicide or being killed by responding law 
enforcement. 
One of the most infamous examples of mass murder in an educational setting 
occurred on May 18, 1927, at the Bath Consolidated School in Bath, Michigan. This 
attack was the worst mass murder attack in the history of the United States until the 
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.166 The adult perpetrator, upset about an increase in his 
taxes and his wife’s declining health, opted to take revenge against the town. He planned 
his malicious attack over many months, systematically hiding dynamite in the basement 
of the school to ensure maximum death and destruction. Prior to executing his plan, he 
murdered his wife, set his home on fire, then drove to the school and killed 39 
children.167 
3. Terrorist Attacks 
Terrorists attack in advancement of their groups’ political or ideological 
agenda.168 Schools provide an opportunity to attack powerfully symbolic targets that are 
chiefly defenseless. Our nation’s schools are practical targets for terrorist attacks 
primarily because they accommodate children in large numbers and operate on 
predictable schedules making the execution of an attack fairly simple.169 Terrorists do not 
have to kill large numbers of young children to achieve their objectives and spread their 
doctrine. Additionally, terrorists have witnessed the impact of school shootings in 
America and realize the fear and intense media coverage that follows.170  
165 Knoll, “Mass Murder: Causes, Classification, and Prevention.”  
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Alternatively, a terrorist organization that intentionally victimizes schoolchildren 
runs the risk of alienating the people, groups, and governments that provide them 
meaningful support as well as accelerating the counterterrorism efforts against them.171  
This is what happened after Beslan.  A terrible tragedy occurred on the morning of 
September 1, 2004 in the southern Russian town when approximately 50 heavily armed 
Chechen terrorists attacked a school, taking more than 1,200 children and adults 
hostage.172 The siege continued for three days until a confrontation with Russian Special 
Forces occurred. An accurate report of casualties is uncertain, but approximately 334 
hostages died in the attack, and 188 of them were children.173 This cowardly attack was 
politically motivated and directed at the Russian leadership but the exaggerated media 
coverage ensured global exposure instilling fear in parents everywhere. A similar attack 
on an American school resulting in the loss of over 300 lives, many of them children, 
would temporarily devastate the American way of life and potentially change the 
educational enterprise forever.174 
4. Targeted Shootings 
Targeted shootings are the fourth category in this typology of school attackers. 
Targeted school shootings occur when the perpetrator selects a target prior to executing 
the attack.175 Unlike a rampage shooting, a targeted attack is not a symbolic attack on the 
entire school or the community at large. The attacker is usually a member or former 
member of the institution and the target selection is often a function of revenge for 
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An example of a targeted school shooting occurred at the Red Lion Area Junior 
High School in Red Lion, Pennsylvania on April 24, 2003. The student attacker shot and 
killed his principal in the cafeteria prior to committing suicide.178 This homicidal action 
offered no clear explanation, but the principal was certainly targeted by the shooter. 
Similar to the example provided about rampage shootings, the access to the victim did 
not warrant hostile intrusion because of the attacker’s enrollment at the school. 
C. CASE STUDY: THE SANDY HOOK MASSACRE 
The availability of substantive literature on the tragedy at the Sandy Hook 
Elementary School is limited. Even so, the state of Connecticut recently published an 
official report regarding this tragic event. As with the other proffered examples of school 
related murders, the identity of the attacker will not be referenced in this thesis. 
The village of Sandy Hook was established early in the eighteenth century and is 
located within the town of Newtown, Connecticut. 179 According to the town’s website, 
“Newtown is a scenic ‘small town’ located in Fairfield County in southwestern 
Connecticut, about sixty miles from New York City.”180 The tranquility of this quaint 
New England community was changed forever on December 14, 2012 when evil came to 
Newtown.181 
The bloodshed that occurred at Sandy Hook Elementary School at the hands of a 
lone gunman resulted in the death of 20 children and six adults.182 The attacker was 
dressed in tactical clothing and was armed with four weapons: a military style assault  
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rifle, two semi-automatic handguns, and a shotgun that was recovered later from his 
vehicle.183 After his suicide, he was located in a classroom carrying hundreds of 
additional rounds of ammunition.184  
The attacker was categorized as a mass murderer consistent with Mushert’s 
definition.185 The number of fatalities in this specific event significantly contributed to 
this classification. This type of mass murderer, also referred to as a “psuedocommando,” 
is commonly driven by strong feelings of anger and resentment, and plans his attack 
meticulously and has a preoccupation with weapons.186 Because the attacker committed 
suicide and is unable to be interviewed, there is no known explanation for this attack. In 
addition, the global positioning system (GPS) was found at the attacker’s residence but its 
memory did not provide investigative value regarding his utilization of surveillance 
techniques to assess the vulnerability of his selected target.187 
Ironically, this one story school possessed a perimeter security system designed to 
control access. The system required all external doors locked at 9:30 every morning, and 
visitors were required to ring a bell and be visibly identified on a monitor prior to gaining 
admission.188 This system was considered elaborate for this small elementary school 
located in a town with a negligible crime rate.189 It is unknown if this security system 
affected the attacker’s plan because he gained entry into the school by shooting out the 
panes of glass adjacent to the front doors.190  
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In the aftermath of this horrific tragedy, significant scrutiny has been focused on 
the actions of the first responder community and their adherence to emergency response 
planning.191 Reports indicate that the initial 911 call reporting gunfire at the school was 
received at 9:35am. No further information, such as the number of attackers or the 
physical location of the attacker, was provided. The first police officers arrived at the 
school at 9:39am but did not immediately enter the building. 192 Instead, responding 
officers encountered an unknown male running along the exterior of the school, and 
assumed he was involved in the attack.193 This individual turned out to be a frightened 
parent whose unfortunate actions hindered their response.194 As additional officers 
arrived, they formed into small teams, entered the school at 9:44am and located the 
gunman dead from a self-inflicted wound.195 The attack on this defenseless school lasted 
fewer than 11 minutes and claimed the lives of 26 innocent people.196  
Current strategies for addressing the danger posed by an active shooter require 
officers to group into small teams before entering the threat environment.197 This tactical 
procedure was devised after the Columbine attacks and was intended to expedite the law 
enforcement response—rather than waiting for SWAT officers with tactical proficiencies 
to arrive. Unfortunately, precious time is wasted waiting for additional personnel to 
arrive. An additional constraint for responding officers was mitigating the lockdown 
procedures initiated by the faculty at the school during the commencement of the attack.  
Lastly, a chaotic scene ensued with numerous police officers, some in plain clothes, self-
deploying and arriving at the school with minimal coordination. The apparent lack of 
command and control and the unfamiliarity with the school’s emergency plan intensified 
the danger in the area.  
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V. INNOVATIVE SECURITY STRATEGIES FOR THE 
EDUCATION ENTERPRISE 
A. ASSESSING PRESENT STRATEGIES 
School security has existed in our society for approximately 60 years.198 The 
aftermath of the brutal attacks that occurred at Columbine High School in 1999 saw the 
emergence of a school security industry largely supported by fear. Researchers, 
criminologists, and purported security experts evaluated techniques and strategies with a 
central focus on quelling peer hostility.199 As previously reported, the two shooters at 
Columbine High School were enrolled members of the graduating class, often referred to 
as being an insider threat, and therefore did not have to penetrate the school’s perimeter 
to commit their atrocious act. Shortly after Columbine and at the direction of the 
Executive Branch, the Department of Education and the United States Secret Service 
collaborated on a research project aimed at understanding the violence. The outputs were 
recommendations for both educators and law enforcement personnel and placed a large 
focus on the mental health of the student attackers as well as their access to weapons.200 
The responsibility for intervention shifted to moderately trained faculty members, while 
political leadership focused on aggressive anti-bullying legislation.  These new strategies 
and attempts to alter school culture are likely to be useless when being attacked by a 
hostile intruder.201 
As the school security industry grew, global events began to shape the 
narrative.202 Shortly after the terror attack on a school in Beslan, Russia, the Department 
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of Education issued a warning to all of the schools in the United States with limited 
instruction on how to deal with a terror strike on their building.203 Additional information 
developed by the United States military revealed that international terrorist had access to 
floor plans of schools in eight states.204 The sensationalized media reporting of these 
events created an increased level of anxiety among parents and school administrators. 
More affluent school districts quickly developed emergency response plans, identified 
and employed a School Security Director, developed parental communication doctrine, 
and practiced responding to potential terrorist attacks.205 In contrast, school districts in 
other cities did not develop plans to respond to attacks on their schools and still do not 
effectively coordinate with first responders. Instead, they are exceedingly reliant on their 
local 911 systems.206 This disparity creates inequality among students and the faculty that 
care for them. Without a universal standard, economic inequality will continue to be a 
significant variable as affluent school districts will offer safer learning environments and 
more secure workplaces. This dynamic may serve to unfairly influence the quality of 
education in economically disadvantaged areas. Additionally, schools in rural settings 
may be unfairly deprived by delayed law enforcement response times.207 
The federal government has allocated considerable financial resources to state 
governments utilizing grant programs from the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Department of Education, and the Department of Justice.  Grant programs for security 
related expenditures require school administrators to complete a vulnerability assessment 
of their school before applying for the requisite funding.208 Although the vulnerability 
assessment process promoted by DHS is straightforward, many school administrators fail 
203 National School Safety Center, Safeguarding Schools against Terror. 
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to take the initiative and opt out of the process entirely.209 Frustrated with the expiration 
policy associated with grant funding, some school districts decline federal assistance.210  
Additionally, there are other forms of assistance offered by the federal 
government. For example, the federal government offers assistance through the 
publication of pamphlets and best practice guides. These booklets are effective crisis 
management tools but fail to address the security components of deterrence, prevention, 
and protection.211 This section will evaluate the present strategies employed in our 
nation’s schools through the lens of efficiency, equality, and fairness. 
1. School Resource Officers 
The School Resource Officer (SRO) program was initiated in 1953 and largely 
remains the bedrock of school security today.212 Initiatives pursued after a widely 
reported violent act at a school often fuel many of the decisions made to utilize this 
program. These officers are tasked with providing security and crime prevention 
strategies, but they also integrate into the school communities and offer a variety of 
services, including counseling and mentoring the student body. 213  In many cases, the 
SRO serves as part of the school leadership team and assists the school in crisis planning 
and personalizing the district’s emergency management plan to that school.214 Many 
assist in training faculty and conducting school lockdown drills. The most important SRO 
function is to build trusting relationships with the students, which is vital in mitigating 
peer hostility.215 
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Many SRO’s are sworn law enforcement personnel with years of experience, who 
are detailed away from normal community policing responsibilities and assigned to the 
school for a defined period of time.216 Conversely, some are retired law enforcement 
officers and are hired directly by the local school committees. Their employment helps 
bridge communication gaps between school administrators and local law enforcement 
and fire service personnel.217  
The SRO program has been scrutinized for its cost benefit to school communities. 
On average, employing these officers costs a community approximately $80,000 per year. 
As shrinking school budgets require reductions in faculty positions, many taxpayers 
question the necessity of the SRO position.218 Additionally, critics decry arrests made by 
SROs for minor criminal offenses on school grounds and the unnecessary introduction of 
students to the juvenile justice system.219 
An examination of historical funding methods revealed the Department of Justice 
COPS program as the primary funding source for this program.220 The proliferation of 
this grant program in 2000 was done largely in response to the public fear generated by 
the incident at Columbine High School. Of note, Columbine High School had a SRO 
assigned, and he exchanged gunfire with the assailants but was unable to mitigate the 
attack. 221 Congressional leadership employed a similar strategy in response to the 
tragedy at the Sandy Hook Elementary School last year and appropriated $45 million for 
the hiring of school resource officers. 222 
Because students perpetrate most school shootings in this country, the majority of 
SROs are deployed to middle schools and high schools, but many elementary schools are 
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left unprotected.223 Additionally, many officers are responsible for multiple school 
buildings, further limiting their effectiveness.224 Lastly, some SROs are unarmed and 
more assimilated to the faculty than the law enforcement community.  
These individuals may be helpful with security preparation but clearly lack the 
means to defend against an armed intruder. Furthermore, there is no available research 
regarding the effectiveness of the SRO program in defending students against an armed 
attack similar to the circumstances in Newtown, Connecticut last year. Policymakers 
should consider the threat posed by these heavily armed “psuedocommando’s” when 
evaluating the composition of a single component security plan. 
The costs associated with placing an armed SRO in each of the 132,000 public 
and private school buildings in the United States would result in an annual fiscal 
expenditure of $12.8 billion.225 This plan would cost between $181 and $413 per student, 
the cost is “between 1.4% and 3.3% of total elementary and secondary school revenues” 
from all available sources.226 These annual expenses are staggering when compared to 
the installation of perimeter security systems with components such as fencing, bollards, 
ballistic glass, and CCTV that have marginal recurring costs. 
The previous analysis describing the typology of school shooters placed an 
emphasis on pre-attack surveillance. The overt presence of a uniformed SRO is 
politically appeasing to many stakeholders and may even serve to deter a potential attack. 
Unfortunately, it is also possible that the attacker would plan to eliminate the SRO prior 
to the commencement of his attack on the school.227 
The evaluation of the SRO program suggests its integration into a multi-faceted 
security plan would maximize value to the school district and its constituents. The SRO 
program has been in existence for approximately 60 years, and school administrators are 
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largely supportive due to the program’s simple implementation. However, little is known 
about the effectiveness of this program, and there is little available data evaluating the 
ability of SRO programs to improve school safety.228 
2. Arming Teachers 
The notion of arming teachers and expecting them to engage an active shooter 
gained national attention in the aftermath of the Sandy Hook shooting. School districts 
cannot mandate teachers to carry weapons but many agreed to allow such a practice.229 
An evaluation of this program demonstrates considerable associated problems. 
Statistical analysis of school shootings from 1979–2008 demonstrates that students 
enrolled in schools commit 75 percent of school shootings. 230 The notion that a teacher 
would act tactically to neutralize a homicidal student has significant aftereffects for the 
school community. Educators are expected to provide an atmosphere for creativity and 
learning while teaching conflict resolution devoid of violence.231 Tasking them with 
security objectives, including authorizing deadly force, contradicts this claim and 
interjects considerable liability.232 
Additionally, teachers designated as armed security personnel will bear the 
burden of retaining custody of their weapon at all times. If forced to leave their 
classrooms to engage an active shooter there will be significant unintended consequences. 
The lack of tactical training and situational awareness adjoined with leaving students  
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unattended during an emergency is wrought with problems.233 Furthermore, responding 
law enforcement officers may mistake the armed teacher for the attacker adding 
confusion to a chaotic situation. 
These two options encompass the status quo in school security, and some schools 
do not even have these options available. This dimension of security offers a “response 
only” strategy. Schools with assigned SROs have a measured level of protection that will 
react to hostile aggression. Efforts to deter the intruder and prevent him from executing 
his violent plans are deficient. Physical security practices designed and implemented to 
secure an established perimeter would significantly assist the SRO program and provide a 
layered approach to school security. 
3. Routine Activities Theory 
Criminologists often examine violent criminal behavior by utilizing the “routine 
activities theory.” This theory tenders that in order for a violent incident to occur, there 
has to be a confluence of three conditions: 
• The presence of a motivated attacker 
• The availability of a suitable target 
• The lack of capable guardians 
The theory asserts that if one of the conditions is removed, the vulnerability and 
subsequent victimization is significantly minimized.234 The routine activities theory can 
also be utilized in examining school shootings. 
A closer examination of the three variables as well as historical information on 
school shootings validate the claim that school shooters are motivated attackers.235 The 
intensity and randomness of the attacks suggest this condition cannot be removed.  
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Furthermore, the theory states that the motivation of the shooter is inconsequential 
compared to his access to the target and the inability of something or someone to stop 
him.236  
Schools and the children who attend them are often targeted due to their symbolic 
status; therefore, an opportunity to remove this condition from the theory does not 
exist.237 The “lack of capable guardians” is the only condition that can be manipulated to 
minimize vulnerability. Capable guardians can be persons or security measures designed 
to deter or defeat the attacker.238 According to the routine activities theory, once capable 
guardianship has been established, the associated vulnerability is reduced and the security 
of the school is improved.239 The application of guardianship is an exercise in risk 
management that has no metrics. The most important facet of the theory is the capability 
of the guardian. The Sandy Hook Elementary School employed an automated access 
control system designed to reduce risk and establish a level of guardianship and this 
system was defeated.  Additionally, the Columbine High School employed a SRO as a 
capable guardian, and he was unable to mitigate the attack.  
This research project examines the application of security methods currently 
employed in many schools throughout the country. Most of the practices are reactionary 
and insufficient. This research project’s evaluative scrutiny identifies both strengths and 
weaknesses in these methodologies and ultimately reasons for a layered approach 
emphasizing interdependent perimeter defenses. The consistency in the application of 
school security procedures is necessary to ensure a level of equality for all students and 
faculty members.  
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B. ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS—PERIMETER DEFENSE 
School buildings, like most venues are distinct in design and construction 
prohibiting a universally implemented security practice.240 However, most schools have a 
perimeter that can be defined and defended. Establishing this perimeter and 
understanding the value of its defense will help school administrators with their security 
planning. Perimeter based defenses can be a very valuable part of an overall 
interdependent security system.  
Research on violent events similar to the attack on the Sandy Hook Elementary 
School reveals that most attackers have limited social networks and therefore do not warn 
anyone of their plans.241 Additionally, once their murderous attack is initiated, it lasts for 
an average of 12 minutes.242 Without perimeter security components implemented to 
delay this attack, victims are forced to wait until responding law enforcement officers 
arrive at the venue. 
The most tactical venue security strategies involve the confluence of components 
and elements providing the protected venue with overlapping and redundant layers of 
security. The components are considered the equipment, procedures, and processes that 
defend the protected venue while the elements are the layers of security designed to 
harden the structure.243 Each layer is an element of security dependent on the 
implemented components and together they comprise the “perimeter security system.” 
This terminology refers to: 
…the system of people, technologies, geophysical features, processes and 
operations employed to secure a particular security interest or potential 
target from unauthorized access, particularly premeditated attacks 
intended to injure, damage, destroy, or impede the normal operations of 
the security interest.244 
240 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Primer to Design Safe School Projects. 
241 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter. 
242 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.” 
243 Shuki Einstein and Don Philpott, The Integrated Physical Security Handbook: Protecting America 
One Facility at a Time (Longboat Key, FL: Government Training, Inc., 2008).  
244 ANSI Homeland Security Standards Panel, Perimeter Security Standardization: A Workshop 
Report (Washington, DC: American National Standards Institute, 2007).  
 53 
                                                 
Perimeter defensive strategies are found in numerous organizations where risk to 
a particular place of interest is present. Effective systems follow a security continuum 
designed to deter, detect, assess, delay, respond, and deny access to a hostile intruder.245 
Modification of this perimeter security system model is easily attainable predicated on 
the protected venue and its existing characteristics.  A perimeter security system 
implemented at a school will serve to deter, detect, delay, and mitigate the consequences 
of an attack by a hostile intruder and will be much different from a system intended to 
also capture the attacker.246 The goal of a perimeter security strategy for schools is to 
significantly impact the mechanics of an attack allowing for armed, trained law 
enforcement interdiction.  
The element of deterrence is the ability of a security system “to cause a potential 
attacker to perceive that the risk of failure is greater than that which they find acceptable, 
resulting in a determination that an attack is not worth the risk.”247 The typology of the 
attacker and his fascination with his selected target can adversely impact the effectiveness 
of this element. Risks posed by deterrence techniques may not dissuade terrorism 
suspects and mass murderers.248 The element of detection is critical to a perimeter 
security system. According to a DHS publication, “Detection refers to the ability to 
identify potential attacks or precursors to an attack and to communicate that 
information, as appropriate.”249 This identification needs to occur at the onset of the 
attack to achieve success. Lastly, the element of denial relies on the physical obstacles 
employed to thwart an attack. This element is largely reactionary and serves to oppose or 
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negate the effects of a hostile intrusion while providing time for responding security 
forces and essential communication within the venue.250 
It is crucial to recognize that flexibility is an integral part of designing a school 
security plan. Differences in architectural design and geographical location will 
dramatically impact strategic decision making. For example, schools in urban 
environments may operate in congested areas and will be unable to establish stout 
perimeters.251  
Achieving reasonable balance in security planning is imperative as there is no 
benefit in implementing draconian measures so restrictive that the school cannot function 
normally or that the students and faculty feel threatened by plan.252Research shows that 
schools require a positive climate to help educators meet key goals, including school 
performance and student achievement.253 Overt security procedures that are impulsively 
employed are likely to have an adverse effect of this requisite climate. The longevity of 
the SRO program illustrates the need for a deliberate assimilation into the educational 
environment. The acceptance of a national school security standard will require 
considerable support from educators and school administrators. Minimizing the 
disruption to the school climate will be paramount to gaining their cooperation. 
The design and implementation of a perimeter security system for a school will be 
influenced by the highly random nature of mass casualty shootings, as well as the daily 
need for convenient access for the achievement of the education mission.254 Additional 
aspects for consideration include the size of the school and the density of its population.  
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The objective of a perimeter security system is to achieve a level of sensible and efficient 
protection by integrating strategic components into the existing environment without 
disrupting daily operations.255 
C. SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
A school’s perimeter security system should be modeled to defend against hostile 
intrusion. These types of attacks are highly emotional and create significant panic in the 
community.256 The characteristics and modes of attack commonly found in assailants 
committed to mass murder and terrorism should become the basis of the system’s 
functionality.257 Additionally, vulnerability assessments completed at specific venues 
provide decision makers with the tactical and strategic data necessary for efficient system 
design.  
Components commonly utilized in a perimeter security system include: 
• Fencing, bollards, and gates to control pedestrian and vehicular access 
• Lighting of vulnerable areas to deter forced entry 
• Closed circuit television cameras used to detect pre-attack activity  
• Automated access control systems  
• Delineated stand-off distances denying unauthorized access 
• Locking mechanisms to secure doorways denying unauthorized access 
• Ballistic glass to defend against an armed intrusion 
• Armed security forces to respond to an attack 
• Panic alarms providing instant communication with local law enforcement 
• Command, communication and control systems used to manage the 
system and mitigate the consequence of an attack258 
These interdependent components fuse into an effective security system and 
provide redundant capabilities to reduce a school’s vulnerability. Although all of these 
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mechanisms are not necessary, the chosen components must complement one another and 
efficiently integrate.259 The School Resource Officer program is an example of a singular 
component often required to work independently without the benefit of this multi-
component system. As stated in an earlier chapter, the effectiveness of the SRO program 
against an armed attacker is unknown but its utility increases exponentially as part of a 
larger system.260 
The function of a security plan is the protection of certain assets, and in the 
education enterprise, the assets are people.261 As policymakers identify the costs and 
constraints associated with reducing vulnerabilities to the schools in their communities, 
they must recognize that an acceptable or tolerable level of risk exists in all security 
planning. This level of risk assigns a value to an asset and is derived from numerous 






These constraints can adversely influence the effectiveness of a perimeter security 
system. In this context, tolerable risk is the amount of risk a community is willing to 
accept as long as risk management options are taken to reduce vulnerability.263 
Comparatively, acceptable risk represents the level of risk a community is prepared to 
accept without employing any risk management options.264A national standard would 
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advocate for a level of tolerable risk, citing the obvious need to protect the education 
systems greatest asset. 
The costs associated with designing and implementing a perimeter security 
system is comprised mostly of labor and equipment.265 Additional expenses for staff 
training and system maintenance must also be budgeted. Although schools are unique in 
design and structure, they have a similar set of vulnerabilities that can be reduced 
utilizing these techniques.266 These inherent similarities and the need for all children to 
be equally safe at school frame the narrative for a national standard of protection. 
D. COMPARABLE STRATEGIES 
Government facilities, financial services, and energy are three of the 16 identified 
sectors of critical infrastructure in the United States. These protected sectors utilize 
comparable perimeter security strategies designed to protect against armed, hostile 
intrusion and attacks on their infrastructure. 
1. Government Facilities 
Immediately after the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in 
Oklahoma City, the federal government identified significant risk associated with 
numerous federal facilities. The Executive Branch of government tasked the Department 
of Justice to develop recommendations for minimum-security standards for federally 
owned or leased facilities.267 Presently, a Department of Homeland Security 
representative chairs an interagency security committee responsible for the coordination 
and development of security standards in all federal facilities. This tasking encompasses 
approximately 440,000 buildings with unique occupants and access requirements.268 The 
model utilized to develop a minimum-security standard in federal buildings is highly 
applicable to the present school security narrative. Perimeter security systems including 
265 Tom LaTourrette, David R. Howell, David E. Mosher, and John MacDonald, Reducing Terrorism 
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barriers, closed-circuit television cameras, intrusion detection alarms, and an armed 
response force are found at most federal facilities helping secure both federal employees 
and the visiting public.  
2. Financial Services 
In 1968, Congress passed the Bank Protection Act.  The intention of this 
legislation was to “discourage robberies, burglaries and larcenies committed against 
financial institutions.”269 The act required physical security measures to be implemented 
and maintained to deter, detect, and defeat would-be criminal networks targeting our 
local financial institutions.270 The growth of technology and today’s interconnected 
economy requires the application of minimum-security standards that are designed to 
protect intellectual information as well as currency systems. Information security 
strategists defend perimeters of computer networks with the similar elements and virtual 
components designed to deny, deter, defend, and mitigate consequence. 
3. Energy 
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) executes a mission 
to ensure the reliability of the Bulk-Power System in North America.271 The energy 
sector and the corporation responsible for its effectiveness apply measures to facilities 
and functions that are considered critical to the support of the electricity infrastructure 
servicing North America.272 These facilities depend on perimeter security systems as well 
as armed guards to mitigate the impact on assets should a physical attack on their facility 
occur.  
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VI. OVERCOMING OBJECTIONS TO A NATIONAL STANDARD 
A. STANDARDS, STAKEHOLDERS, AND METRICS 
The realization of a national standard aimed at the achievement of an enhanced 
level of security in American schools will be a challenging policy endeavor. Although 
standardization is common in other areas of education, the establishment of a set of rules 
governing security practices will require strategic alliances with numerous stakeholders. 
The effectiveness and efficiency of the standard will need to be assigned discernible 
metrics and compulsory compliance will be required. Lastly, the policy will require 
incremental implementation as to not disrupt the academic environment.273 Standardizing 
school security will create strategic doctrine that can be consistently iterated to improve 
safety while also promoting equality and fairness for individual school communities. This 
proposed national standard should be a collaborative effort and serve as the minimum 
level of security provided to all schoolchildren. 
The standardization of school security will provide the requisite framework for 
increased synergy between educators and the first responder community. The planning 
process will act as a formal record, settings goals, and securing commitments.274 
Additionally, the achievement of a standard will improve the development and 
dissemination of best practices. 
The protection of students pursuing an education is a significant concern of 
federal, state, and local government officials.275 Federal legislation, specifically the No 
Child Left behind Act of 2001, provides instruction to schools regarding the use of 
federal school safety funding needed to establish plans for keeping schools safe and drug 
free.276 The lack of a universal standard creates a policy gap between government 
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factions. State and local education leaders are not achieving the expectation established 
by this federal statute, and the federal government has limited enforcement options. The 
establishment of a national security standard will help insure consistency and fairness for 
all affected stakeholders.  
A stakeholder is an individual or group with an interest in the success of an 
organization.277 The academic environment has numerous stakeholders that will be 
affected by the development and implementation of this policy. The application of a 
national security standard to the education enterprise will require strategic alliances with 
both internal and external stakeholders.  
Internal stakeholders operate within the school system on a daily basis and will 
directly benefit from an appreciable level of security. This group will also be required to 
address any unintended consequences associated with the proposed strategy. This group 
includes students, parents, school staff, and, to some extent, school boards.278 Some 
teachers are resistant to excessive security controls at their schools and are fearful of 
isolation from the community.279 They appreciate an open, welcoming campus and 
believe regulated safety will have an adverse effect. It should be noted that data is scarce 
on the impact of perimeter security systems on student populations. It is also unknown 
whether the implementation of a national security standard would negatively impact 
students’ perceptions of their own personal safety. 280 These two groups are essential to 
the achievement of this proposal and must be included as part of the strategic planning 
process. 
External stakeholders operate in the education enterprise’s margins but are 
partners needed to sustain the achievement of this proposed standard. The limitations 
associated with internal stakeholders involve the transitory characteristics of students and 
277 Stan Paine and Richard McCann, “Engaging Stakeholders: Including Parents and the Community 
to Sustain Improved Reading Outcomes,” Sustainability Series, no 6. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department 
of Education, 2009). 
278 Ibid. 
279 Peter Boyd and Greg Vizzini, “Should Schools be More Like Fortresses?” California Teachers 
Association 17,, no. 6. 
280 Borum et al., “What can be done about School Shootings?” 27–37. 
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faculty. The external group has more permanence in the community and includes 
taxpayers, political leadership, members of the business community, and law 
enforcement practitioners.281  
The implementation of national school security standard would immediately 
improve accountability and provide children with a safer learning environment. Unlike 
the status quo, various metrics can be applied to assess the performance of a complete 
perimeter security system or even an individual system component.282  
Examples of possible performance metrics include: 









B. STATES' RIGHTS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
The implementation of a national school security standard will require significant 
intergovernmental collaboration. There is no national education system in the United 
States, and state and local governments are considerably burdened with federal education 
mandates.283 The prospect of another mandate for school security is a potential limitation 
to policy implementation.  
Mandates are federal laws passed by the United States Congress with regulations 
prescribed by federal agencies compelling state and local governments to accomplish 
281 Paine and McCann, “Engaging Stakeholders.”  
282 ANSI Homeland Security Standards Panel, Perimeter Security Standardization. 
283 Neil McCluskey, Downsizing the Federal Government: K-12 Education Subsidies (Washington, 
DC: Cato Institute, 2009). 
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goals of national importance.284 Congressional leadership has used mandates to achieve 
goals without increasing the federal budget.285  
Mandates can be fully funded, partially funded, or unfunded by the federal 
government. Compliance with unfunded federal mandates strains the annual budgets of 
state and local governments, occasionally resulting in lost revenue.286 Federal grant 
programs have been utilized to offset some of the associated costs; however, restricted 
federal budgets significantly reduced this resource and created an untenable situation for 
subnational entities.287 
The most appropriate regulatory technique for the achievement of a national 
school security standard would be a partial Pre-emption. This effort would produce the 
intergovernmental partnerships necessary for policy proposal advancement. The federal 
government can develop the standards with necessary input from identified stakeholders, 
and state governments would play an important role providing critical resources, such as 
staff, legal enforcement authority, and local political legitimacy.288 Without the 
involvement of state governments, federal officials would be responsible for policy 
enforcement with a limited staff and inadequate fiscal resources.289 Substantial state 
involvement also promotes a degree of governmental decentralization due to “the critical 
role played by states in implementing, and in some cases promulgating, national 
standards.”290 Lastly, local government involvement is critical for political acceptance 
and financial assistance.  This interdependence of governments is not a perfect strategy 
primarily because states can opt out of the program and although sanctions such as the 
284 Stacy Anderson and Russell Constantine, Unfunded Mandates (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law 
School, 2005). 
285 Adam M. Zaretsky, “A Gift Horse for the States: Federal Mandates,” The Regional Economist 
(April 1993). 
286 Anderson and Constantine, Unfunded Mandates. 
287 Zaretsky, “A Gift Horse for the States.” 
288 Paul L. Posner, “The Politics of Preemption: Prospects for the States,” Political Science and 
Politics 38, no. 3 (2005): 371–374.  
289 Zaretsky, “A Gift Horse for the States.” 
290 Posner, “The Politics of Preemption.” 
 64 
                                                 
withholding of federal funding could be imposed, it is an obstruction to achieving a 
national standard.291 
C. DISRUPTION OF THE LEARNING ENVIRONMENT 
This top-down policy model recognizes that successful implementation will 
require support from the internal stakeholders, who have continuously voiced their 
opposition to security measures in schools.292 The primary opponents of school security 
practices argue that the presence of SRO’s and other security components has changed 
the role of teachers assigning ultimate authority to the security officers.293 These 
stakeholders have worked in the education setting for many years and deride the 
diminished student—teacher relationship. These critics proffer that stringent security 
produces interpersonal barriers and causes friction within the school community.294 They 
also believe that security practices alter the schools operating environment and can be 
counterproductive and undesirable.295 
The limitation of the available literature on this specific topic is noteworthy 
because most of the information addresses interior security practices intended to quell 
student directed violence. Social controls, such as metal detection equipment; cameras in 
school hallways, and zero tolerance policies, are not the focus of this proposal, and they 
will not prevent hostile unauthorized intrusion.296 
If implemented incrementally, perimeter security systems will have a much less 
disruptive effect on the academic environment. These are the same mechanisms 
stakeholders encounter at airports, banks, and professional sporting events, even Disney 
291 Ibid. 
292 Myrstol, “Public Perceptions.” 
293 Shannon Womer Phaneuf, “School Security Practices: Investigating their Consequences on Student 
Fear, Bonding and School Climate” (PhD diss., University of Maryland).  
294 Nance, “School Security Considerations after Newtown.” 
295 Pedro A. Noguera, “Schools, Prisons, and Social Implications of Punishment: Rethinking 
Disciplinary Practices,” Theory into Practice 42,, no. 4 (2003): 341–350. 
296 Muschert, Research in School Shootings, 60–80. 
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World.297 The layered components, selected by the decision makers, will not impact a 
student’s opportunity to learn. However, the overt presence of the proposed component 
driven system will most definitely demonstrate the community’s concern about violence 
and could make students more aware of the threat.298  
Incremental implementation of a national school security standard will be much 
less disruptive and much more cost effective. Achieving the balance necessary to reduce 
risks, maintain open access for students and faculty, enable proper building function, and 
conform to aesthetic requirements is vital.299 
The evaluation of these security strategies and whether they actually improve the 
safety of the school or not remains to be determined; however, the achievement of this 
national standard communicates that America takes the threat of violence in the education 
enterprise seriously and is actively doing something to combat it.300  
D. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Designing a perimeter security system that will function as a national standard 
cannot be a “one size fits all” proposal. The selection and implementation of protective 
components to achieve a necessary standard of protection at an acceptable cost is critical 
to the risk management process.301 A limitation to implementation is the accompanying 
costs of this proposal, expected to exceed 20 billion dollars.  
Incentive-based programs encourage rapid adoption of a standard. The federal 
government has previously offered incentives in education and health related programs to 
increase participation.302 Incentives for expeditious adoption of this security standard 
would need to address the needs of both external and internal stakeholders. External 
297 Dorn and Dorn, Innocent Targets. 
298 Phaneuf, “School Security Practices.” 
299 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Primer to Design Safe School Projects. 
300 Phaneuf, “School Security Practices.” 
301 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Primer to Design Safe School Projects. 
302 Bradley M. Allan and Ronald Flyers, Jr., “The Powers and Pitfalls of Education Incentives,” paper 
no 2011-07, September 2011, The Hamilton Project, 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/092011_incentives_fryer_allen_paper2.pdf.  
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incentives may include reductions on insurance premiums due to the added security. This 
incentive may help communities reprogram resources to other depleted areas. Internal 
incentives could be influenced by grants to fund technological equipment that would not 
otherwise be budgeted. 
1. Federal Government 
The federal government has a limited but strategic role in the establishment of a 
national school security standard. National awareness including support from the 
executive branch is essential for political and social acceptance. Current fiscal constraints 
and the potential for a lack of consensus for this proposed top-down federal standard 
could adversely affect subsequent grant allocation and overall support. The research 
demonstrates an acceptance of top down regulation only after a critical incident has 
occurred.303 Affordable federal loans and financing options for state and local 
governments may help replace traditional grant support and assist the implementation 
process.304  
2. State Government 
State governments also have applicable grant programs but alternative-financing 
options should also be explored.305 As an example, many states maintain state 
infrastructure banks to provide loans for infrastructure projects.306 Because schools are 
recognized as critical infrastructure, these funds may be apportioned.  Additionally, bond 
financing is also a possible vehicle to assist with project financing. Governments use 
bonds to finance large infrastructure projects that would normally be over the limitations 
of annual budgets.307  
303 White House, “Now is the Time.” 
304 Kevin DeGood, Thinking Outside the Farebox: Creative Approaches to Financing Transit Projects 
(Washington, DC: Transportation for America, 2003) . 
305 Hill, The Cost of Arming Schools. 
306 DeGood, Thinking Outside the Farebox. 
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Additionally, and a subject for further review, tax increment bonds are a form of 
revenue that takes advantage of the increased property tax revenues that could result from 
the school district investment.308 School shootings result in an increase in private school 
enrollment with parents assuming their children will be safer once removed from the 
public system.309 It is unknown if the implementation of a national school security 
standard would serve to increase surrounding land values. If applicable, as the assessed 
value of land rises and property tax revenues increase, the increase in property taxes is 
utilized to make payments to the bondholders.310  Lastly, citizens can be included in this 
public policy decision by exercising a democratic procedure known as a referendum. In a 
binding referendum stakeholders can vote on a measure regarding the allocation of 
resources and the subsequent impact on the tax levy.311  
3. Local Governments 
Local governments are significant partners in this initiative. In 2010, they 
collected general revenues totaling over $1.4 trillion, with 60 percent coming from local 
taxes, fees, and miscellaneous receipts.312 Local governments have numerous revenue 
generating options not available to their state and federal partners. They often use sales 
tax to supplement a project’s revenue strategy. The process requires the legislature to 
enable a statute providing local jurisdictions with the authority to impose a dedicated 
sales tax to support the project.313  
4. Filling the Gap 
An additional innovative option includes the formation of a public-private 
partnership. A public-private partnership serves as an agreement between a public agency 
308 Ibid. 
309 Abouk and Adams, “School Shootings and Private School Enrollment.” 
310 DeGood, Thinking Outside the Farebox. 
311 Dan Ritsche, Referenda and Recall: Letting the People Decide (Wisconsin: Wisconsin Legislative 
Reference Bureau, February, 2006). 
312 “State and Local Tax Policy: What are the Sources of Revenue for Local Governments?” Tax 
Policy Center.  
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and a private sector entity that combine resources to develop a product or service that 
improves the quality of life for the public.314 This approach allows the public sector 
partner to provide a “sizeable customer base for the private sector to warrant investments 







314 Thomas Cellucci, Innovative Public-Private Partnerships: Pathway to Effectively Solving 
Problems (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
315 Ibid. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
1. Universal Threat Recognition 
School security has been in existence for 60 years and since 1999, the United 
States government has spent more than 1 billion dollars on school security efforts.316 The 
expenditures were dedicated to a nationwide school resource officer program. 
Additionally, 84 percent of approximately 130,000 schools in the United States have 
written emergency operation plans designed to help protect students and faculty 
members. This information demonstrates that a narrative already exists in surrounding 
school shootings. 
2. Schools are Considered National Critical Infrastructure  
National critical infrastructure is defined as the:  
…systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would 
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.317  
In 2006, schools and universities were recognized as CI and a collective focus on 
protective methodology in the educational environment emerged.  
3. Psuedocommando’s and Terrorists  
The perpetrators of mass shootings and terrorist attacks often require hostile 
intrusion into the perimeter of a school prior to the assailant committing the violence. The 
common thread of these two attackers is they meticulously plan their operations and are 
always heavily armed. The present school security practices, including the overreliance 
on school resource officers, are inadequately modeled to defend against this attack 
typology. 
316 U.S. Department of Justice, “COPS: Community Oriented Policing Services.” 
317 Public Law 107-56, 107th Cong., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, 1016 (e). 
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4. The Status Quo—School Resource Officers and Armed Teachers 
School resource officers are law enforcement agents assigned to school districts 
and tasked with providing security and crime prevention strategies. They also integrate 
into the school communities offering a variety of services to include counseling and 
mentoring the student body.318 The cost of employing an officer at a school is 
approximately $80,000 per year, and many positions are paid for by federal grant monies. 
These grants average life span is three years, absent renewal, the school district is largely 
defenseless. Additionally, the concept of arming teachers and expecting them to engage 
an active shooter gained national attention in the aftermath of the Sandy Hook shooting. 
School districts cannot mandate teachers to carry weapons but many agreed to allow such 
a practice.319 
5. Routine Activities Theory 
The theory asserts that that in order for a violent incident to occur, there has to be 
a confluence of three conditions: the presence of a motivated attacker, the availability of 
a suitable target, and the lack of capable guardians. The theory asserts that if one of the 
conditions is removed, the vulnerability and subsequent victimization is significantly 
minimized.320 Persons or security measures designed to deter or defeat the attacker can 
establish capable guardianship at a venue such as a school.321 
6. Interdependent Security Systems 
The most tactical venue security strategies involve the union of components and 
elements providing the protected venue with redundant layers of security. The 
components are considered the equipment, procedures, and processes that defend the 
protected venue while the elements are the layers of security designed to harden the 
structure.322 Each layer is an element of security dependent on the implemented 
318 Satullo, “Bethlehem Area School District.” 
319 Johnson, “Guns Already Allowed in Schools.” 
320 Clarke and Eck, Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers. 
321 Ibid. 
322 Einstein and Philpott, The Integrated Physical Security Handbook. 
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components, and together they comprise the “perimeter security system.” The goal of a 
perimeter security strategy for schools is to significantly delay the mechanics of an attack 
allowing for armed, trained law enforcement interdiction.  
7. Performance Measurement 
The implementation of national school security standard immediately improves 
accountability, enhances information sharing, and improves communication between 
educators and first responders. Unlike the status quo, various metrics can be applied to 
assess the performance of a complete perimeter security system or individual system 
components. In addition, future iterations can be made based on reviews. 
8. Mandates and Partial Pre-emption 
Mandates are federal laws passed by the United States Congress and regulations 
prescribed by federal agencies compelling state and local governments to accomplish 
goals of national importance.323 Mandates can be funded partially of fully by the federal 
government but most are unfunded burdening state and local budgets. Partial Pre-
emptions establish basic federal standards for a program but leave execution to the states 
if they meet these minimum standards or legislate stricter ones. Effectively, partial Pre-
emptions turn the states into regional offices of the federal government by requiring 
states to carry out the directives of the federal government. Grant monies routinely 
address the funding issue. 
9. Incremental Implementation 
Incremental implementation of a national school security standard will be much 
less disruptive to the academic environment, more cost effective, and more appealing to 
stakeholders. It is vital to achieve the requisite balance necessary to reduce risks, 
maintain open access for students and faculty, enable proper building function, and 
conform to aesthetic requirements.324 
323 Anderson and Constantine, Unfunded Mandates. 
324 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Primer to Design Safe School Projects. 
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10. Public Financing 
For successful policy implementation, innovative funding options must be 
explored. The employment of a public-private partnership would be the logical choice. 
According to Cellucci: 
A public-private partnership is an agreement between a public agency and 
a private sector entity that combines skills and resources to develop a 
technology, product and/or service that improves the quality of life for the 
general public.325 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis sought to answer a specific research question: Could a national school 
security standard make America’s education system safer?  This thesis has shown that the 
security of the education enterprise would improve with the achievement of such a 
standard and the adoption of a system specifically designed to defend a school’s 
perimeter. The research reveals that the threat of violence facing schools emanates from 
two distinct sources: peer hostility and an unauthorized hostile intruder. The intruder is a 
meticulous planner, often heavily armed, and intent on mass murder.  Reducing the risk 
from this assailant must be emphasized due to the extreme consequences associated with 
his actions. This rationale is centered on the egregious characteristics of these adult 
attackers and their devastating impact their attacks have on communities. Their 
typologies and tactics can be defeated by a perimeter security system and the foundation 
of the proposed standard. 
The secondary question answered in this thesis addressed the design and 
implementation of a national standard with a focus on interdependent security 
components functioning in a fused system that offer schools a redundant level of security. 
Single components, such as school resource officers, are necessary but are primarily used 
to respond to an attack in progress. Prevention and protection need to supplant response 
and recovery in the school security narrative. The implementation of such a system must 
be done incrementally and with the consensus of key stakeholders. 
325 Cellucci, Innovative Public-Private Partnerships. 
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Lastly, this thesis has examined how state and local communities would 
implement this policy in fiscally constrained environments. The answer to this question is 
dependent on the outputs of the necessary vulnerability assessments. No two schools are 
exactly alike, and differences exist between school districts and local communities. 
Certain schools may have considerable vulnerabilities and therefore require a more 
elaborate security system, while other schools may have minimal vulnerability. More 
clarity regarding resource allocation will be available once all of the assessments are 
complete. 
DHS promotes collaboration and community engagement and both principles will 
be needed for the successful achievement of this standard. The following 
recommendations will assist homeland security officials frame a fair, efficient, and 
effective policy. 
1. Appoint the Department of Homeland Security as the Sector Specific 
Agency for the Education Facilities Sub-Sector 
The replacement of the Department of Education as the SSA will assist 
policymakers with the intrinsic social and political obstacles that will come with policy 
implementation.326 Additionally, this strategic maneuver should signal support from the 
executive branch of the federal government. 
2. Ensure 100 Percent Compliance with Emergency Operations 
Planning 
Of all the schools in the country, 84 percent have reported to the Department of 
Education that they are compliant with this initiative.327 Although impressive, this 
percentage needs to improve, as does the amount of situational drills conducted every 
year. Collaboration between school officials and law enforcement leadership also needs 
to improve.328 
326 U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Education, Education Facilities 
Sector. 
327 White House, “Now is the Time.” 
328 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Emergency Management. 
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3. Every School in the Country Should Identify a Security Director 
Ideally, this individual is hired by the school district, is the primary point of 
contact for all security related matters, and has crisis management experience.329 If fiscal 
restraints prohibit the employment of an experienced professional for this task, 
administrators should identify and empower a member of the faculty. Once identified, 
this designee will work with DHS security experts to better understand vulnerability and 
risk management strategies.330 This individual will serve an important role improving 
synergy between the school community and the first responder community.  
4. Conduct the Requisite Vulnerability Assessments  
The risk management process is difficult without the completion of venue-specific 
vulnerability appraisals.331 Once completed, school district leadership will better 
understand the areas of concern and the resources required to improve the level of 
security. The prospect of resource allocation in economically constrained environments 
will be dependent on accurate appraisals of venue vulnerability. 
5. Increase Awareness Regarding School Security  
The coldblooded attack on the Sandy Hook Elementary School claimed the lives 
of 20 innocent children. The effects of this tragedy, similar to domestic terrorist attacks, 
momentarily gripped the country’s attention. Political leadership promised numerous 
resources and the promotion of greater threat awareness.332 Unfortunately, the 
seriousness of the threat was lost in the public’s “issue attention cycle.” A greater 
emphasis on risk reduction from the executive branch of the federal government could 
strongly influence public attitudes and help policymakers overcome social acceptance 
constraints. 
329 U.S. Department of Education, Practical Information on Crisis Planning. 
330 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Primer to Design Safe School Projects. 
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6. Establish a Minimum-Security Standard for all Schools 
The establishment of a national school security standard will help create an 
effective framework for policy iteration and future information sharing by means of best 
practices.333  Additionally, the achievement of a national standard promotes fairness and 
equality and ensures that all children and the dedicated faculty that serve them are 
allowed to thrive in a safe, secure environment.  
7. Design Perimeter Security Systems into All New Construction  
Similar to the required fire/life safety measures found in all newly constructed 
school buildings, a perimeter security system based on a vulnerability assessment should 
also be required by local communities.334 
C. CONCLUSION 
Schools are vulnerable to an attack from heavily armed homicidal adults because 
decision makers focus on resilience and recovery not prevention and mitigation. This 
research has highlighted the associated risks and established the transformation 
framework necessary to improve school security. Homeland security officials working 
collaboratively with academic partners can concentrate on effective perimeter defenses to 
deny unauthorized access to students all while preserving the essential learning 
environment.  
The establishment of a national standard will help promote social and political 
acceptance with key stakeholders but the allocation of resources should be a function of 
state and local governance. This research does not offer an absolute solution to 
eliminating violent mass shootings at schools, but it helps provide an understanding of 
the risks that schools face and the detrimental reactive policies of the status quo.  
Future research should focus on the financial aspects of achieving a National 
School Security Standard to include an economic model illustrating the difference 
between the status quo and the nationwide implementation of perimeter security systems. 
333 ETSI, What are Standards? 
334 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Primer to Design Safe School Projects. 
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Before this can be accomplished, the necessary vulnerability assessments must be 
completed so that resources can be justly assigned. Additionally, the combination of a 
referendum regarding perimeter security systems for schools and the notion of tolerable 
risk should be examined further. Would a safer school system be worth a marginal 
increase in the local tax levy? Would young families move to communities that would 
vote for such an increase and if so, would there be a value proposition for security 
conscious communities? 
Additional research can also focus on the issue of unintended consequences. Will 
the achievement of this national standard shift the risk of mass murder to a school bus or 
Varsity basketball game? Is shifting the threat somewhere else within the community an 
acceptable practice?   
Understanding we cannot completely reduce risk in a democracy, should not a 
priority be given to schoolchildren? Children are our future and a key factor for continued 
national affluence. As a nation with vast intellect and substantial resources, a national 
commitment must be made to insure that a massacre like the attack on the Sandy Hook 
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